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COMMENT
Health Care: ERISA Preemption and HMO Liability
A Fresh Look at ERISA Preemption in the Context of
Subscriber Claims Against HMOs

-

L Introduction
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act'
(ERISA) to secure the future of private employee pensions and welfare benefit
plans. ERISA federalized the law of employee benefits and, in the process,
overcame innumerable barriers to the reliable utilization of employee benefit plans
It displaced conflicting and duplicative state laws, and it provided minimum
standards for the establishment, operation, and administration of employee benefit
plans.3 ERISA also imposed special fiduciary obligations on employers and plan
administrators.4 Most importantly, ERISA established a federal cause of action for
plan participants to recover benefits or enforce rights granted to them under the
terms of their benefit plans.'
To complete its goal of federalizing employee benefits law, Congress included
section 514 of ERISA, which states that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."6
Through this broadly worded provision, ERISA has been held to preempt a myriad
of state statutes and the common law relating to employee benefit plans! For
instance, a state motor vehicle law cannot preclude a benefit plan from requiring
reimbursement for benefit payments from a claimant's tort recovery. 8 ERISA also
preempts state laws that prohibit employees' retirement pension benefits from being
reduced by an award of workers' compensation benefits For over twenty years,
ERISA preemption has steadfastly protected employee benefit plans from direct and
indirect state regulation.

1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
2. See Frank Cummings, ERISA Litigation:An Overview of Major Claims and Defenses, in BAsic
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW - IN DEPTH 255, 264 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 8, 1996),
available in Westlaw, CB03 ALI-ABA 255.
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).

4. See id. §§ 1101-1109.
5.See id. § 1132.
6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 514,29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
7. See Catherine L. Fisk, The LastArticle About the Language of ERISA Preemption?A Case Study
of the Failureof Textualism, 33 HARv.J. ON LEGIs. 35, 35 (1996).
8.See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 65 (1990).
9. See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 (1992).
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In 1997, however, the wall of ERISA preemption appears to be crumbling in the
midst of the turbulent debate over the future of our nation's health care system.
Over one-half of all American workers receive their health care coverage through
ERISA-governed employee benefit plans." Consequently, almost every aspect of
the national debate over health care reform implicates ERISA. On one front, ERISA
preemption has stood as the primary obstacle to state health care reform
initiatives." State governments have increasingly demanded that Congress grant
ERISA waivers to allow the states to enact their own health care reform
initiatives." In twenty years, Congress has granted only one ERISA waiver. 3

However, the 105th Congress appears likely to reconsider waivers from ERISA
preemption as a way of returning power to the states and fostering experimentation

with health care cost containment. 4
An equally challenging issue in the health care debate involves ERISA
preemption of legal claims brought under state law against health maintenance
organizations (HMOs). HMOs are quickly displacing hospitals as the central players
in the delivery of health care across the nation. 5 These entities draw a large
percentage of their subscribers from ERISA-governed employee benefit plans and,
thus, operate as components of such plans. As a consequence, HMOs frequently
invoke ERISA preemption as a defense to legal actions brought against them under

state law.
Many courts have held that ERISA preempts claims against HMOs operating as
part of employee benefit plans, 6 including claims for breach of contract, 7
10. See Jack. K. Kilcullen, Groping for the Reins: ERISA, HMO Malpractice, and Enterprise
Liability, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 9 (1996).
11. See Walter E. Schuler, The ERISA Pre-emption Narrows: Analysis of New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company and Its Impact on State
Regulation of Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 783, 784 (1996).
12. See id. at 785-86; see also 139 CONG. REc. E3126 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Wyden) (explaining the necessity of obtaining an ERISA waiver for Oregon's health care reform
legislation). The call for ERISA waivers also comes from proponents of state bills to expand HMO
liability in cases of medical negligence. In Texas, for example, the state senate is currently considering
a bill that would prevent any health insurance carrier, HMO, or other managed care entity from including
in its provider contracts a clause releasing it from liability or requiring indemnification from its providers.
See Tex. S.B. 386, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1997) (introduced Jan. 30, 1997). Governor George W. Bush
has indicated that he will veto the bill if it passes. See Stephanie Anderson Forest & Mike McNamee,
Revenge of the HMO Patients,Bus. WK., Mar. 17, 1997, at 30. However, even legislative consideration
of the measure carries significant implications when taken in conjunction with the federal debate over
ERISA waivers.
13. Congress grantcd an ERISA waiver to Hawaii in 1983 to allow it to implement its own universal
health care plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5) (1988). The waiver exempts the Hawaii Prepaid Health
Care Act from preemption but preempts state amendments "to the extent it provides for more than the
effective administration of such Act." Id. In 1992, Congress considered but did not enact a general
ERISA waiver for states that enacted health reform legislation. See S. 3180, 102d Cong. § 2108 (1992).
14. The actions of the 104th Congress with regard to welfare reform suggest a congressional focus
on returning power from the federal government to state governments. The 1996 Election results seem
to promise a similar focus from the 105th Congress.
15. See L. Frank Coan, Jr., You Can't Get There From Here - Questioning the Erosion of ERISA
Preemption in Medical MalpracticeActions Against HMOs, 30 GA. L. REv. 1023, 1024 (1996).
16. This is true even if ERISA provides no alternative remedy. See Cannon v. Group Health Serv.,
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fraud, 8 negligence, 9 and medical malpractice.' Other courts, after finding that
ERISA does not preempt these claims, have held HMOs liable to the subscribers
that they have harmed.!' These courts differ dramatically in their interpretation and
analysis of ERISA preemption.
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has never addressed ERISA
preemption of subscriber claims against HMOs that operate as part of employee
benefit plans. Moreover, the thirteen existing Supreme Court opinions" involving
ERISA preemption in other contexts have failed to provide clear guidance to lower
courts.' In a series of early cases questioning the proper scope of ERISA
preemption, the Supreme Court relied on a literalist approach that resulted in a
remarkably broad interpretation of section 514.' Subsequent to these cases, lower
courts have struggled, in vain, to find a manageable framework within this
expansive approach through which they could apply ERISA preemption to claims
against HMOs. The result has been a panoply of confusion among courts, HMOs,
physicians, and subscribers over what conduct is actionable, who is responsible for
what services, and what remedies for injustice are available.
However, in New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plansv.
Travelers Insurance Co., a unanimous Supreme Court significantly narrowed its
interpretation of ERISA preemption. The TravelersCourt recognized the difficulties
presented by its prior broad interpretations.' The Court offered a new approach
that focuses on defining the outer limits of ERISA's preemptive scope by referring
to congressional intent at the time of ERISA's passage as well as the degree to

77 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 66 (1996).
17. See, e.g., Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993).
18. See, e.g., Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 505, 509 (10th Cir. 1991).
19. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992).
20. See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1482, 1495 (7th Cir. 1996).
21. See Robert J.Conrad, Jr. & Patrick D. Seiter, HealthPlan Liability in the Age of Managed Care,
62 DEF. COUNS. J. 191, 193 (1995) (discussing Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct. Riverside
County 1993), in which a jury awarded a plaintiff $89 million against an HMO not covered by ERISA).
22. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 117 S.Ct. 832
(1997); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct.
1671 (1995); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86 (1993); District
of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
498 U.S. 133 (1990); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S.
107 (1989); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825 (1988); Fort Halifax Packing
Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463"U.S. 85 (1983); Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
23. Justice Scalia noted the lack of clarity in the Supreme Court's ERISA jurisprudence in his
concurring opinion in Dillingham. Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. 832, 843 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[O]ur prior
decisions have not succeeded in bringing clarity to the law.").
24. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Alessi v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
25. 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995).
26. See id. at 1677.
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which a state law affects employee benefit plans.' Although Travelers did not
specifically address the issue of subscriber claims against HMOs, the Court's

opinion suggests that the scope of ERISA preemption may not encompass all such
claims.'
The Travelers opinion has sparked significant disagreement among courts and
legal scholars over the proper scope of ERISA preemption in the context of claims
against H1MOs. Scme legal scholars discount Travelers as a temporary departure
from the earlier, more expansive approach to determining ERISA preemption. 9
These scholars clearly favor a broad interpretation of section 514, citing the many
"procedural ills" of pre-ERISA employee benefits law." Despite the attractiveness
of some arguments in favor of broad preemption, other legal experts applaud the
Travelers Court for taking a narrower view of ERISA's preemptive scope.3 These
scholars argue that preemption has prevented beneficial state efforts at health care
reform, unwisely shifted the balance of power from states to the federal government,
and improperly shielded HMOs and other large corporate entities from taking legal
responsibility for their wrongful actions? 2 Even among these scholars, however,
there is significant disagreement over the actual implications of Travelers on the
development of a manageable framework by which to determine ERISA preemption.
Indeed, few commentaries have ventured to suggest a framework by which courts
could determine the appropriate scope of section 514."
Many courts are in a similar disarray over the Travelers opinion. Subsequent to

Travelers, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Tenth, and Seventh
Circuits reached different conclusions on whether ERISA preempts medical

malpractice claims brought against HMOs under the theory of respondeat
superior.'

The circuit court split over this single issue of ERISA preemption

27. See id.
28. See id. at 1683. The TravelersCourt indicated that laws which affect only indirectly the relative
prices of health insurance, including "myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject to local
regulation .... Congress could not possibly have intended to eliminate." Id.
29. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 2, at 302-04. This view has been weakened by the unanimous
Supreme Court opinion in California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction, N.A., 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997). The Dillingham Court reaffirmed Travelers' narrow
interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause when it held that California's prevailing wage laws do not
relate to employee benafit plans and are not preempted by ERISA. Id. at 842.
30. See, e.g., Curranings, supra note 2, at 302-04.
31. See, e.g., Schuler, supra note 11, at 793 (concluding that states will have more power to regulate
in the health care arena after Travelers);Fisk, supra note 7, at 93 (arguing in favor of policy-oriented
approach taken by Travelers over "textualist" approach of earlier preemption cases); Seema R. Shah,
Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip on HMO Medical Malpractice Claims:A Response to Pacificare of
Oklahoma v. Burrage, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1545, 1572 (1996) (approving narrower objective-based
approach).
32. See, e.g., Schuler, supranote 11, at 783-84 (noting ERISA preemption's blockade of state health
care reform initiatives); Torin A. Dorros & T. Howard Stone, Implications of Negligent Selection and
Retention of Physicianr in the Age of ERISA, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 383, 385 (1995) (same).
33. See, e.g., Coan supra note 15, at 1060 (recommending, without further suggestion, the need for
a new interpretive framework).
34. In Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995), the Third Circuit held that ERISA
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reveals that, even after the Travelers Court refined its interpretation of section 514,
the preemption borderline remains hazy and indistinct in the area of claims against
HMOs.
This comment proposes a clear analytical framework for courts to follow in
determining whether ERISA preempts a state law claim against an HMO. The
proposed framework closely follows the statutory language of ERISA and the
interpretive guidelines set forth in Travelers. It would not alter the substantive rights
of any plan sponsor or beneficiary. However, the framework proposed in this
comment would provide more clarity to the law of ERISA preemption as well as
help define the appropriate role of HMOs in our nation's health care system.
The comment begins, in Part II, by discussing the emergence and operation of
HMOs in the United States, including the legal quagmire in which HMOs have
become embroiled. Part III of the comment explores the application and importance
of ERISA to the issue of HMO liability. This section also discusses the tortured
interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause by the Supreme Court and suggests the
need for a new interpretive framework for determining the scope of ERISA
preemption. Part IV proposes a more definitive approach to determining the scope
of ERISA preemption based on the plain meaning of section 514 and the reasoning
set forth in Travelers. Part V studies the various theories of liability advanced
against lIMOs and discusses ERISA preemption of those legal claims, including
how ERISA's preemption clause would apply under the proposed framework. Part
VI concludes with an analysis of the beneficial effect this new approach would have
on the issues of ERISA preemption and HMO liability.
II. The Emergence and Operation of HMOs
An understanding of HMOs requires recognition of the fact that health
management arose not to restrain medical care but to contain medical costs. Thus,
management of health care is only the means used to manage health costs.
Ironically, the two entities most responsible for rising costs are the same entities
most responsible for efforts to contain those costs - the health insurance industry
and the federal government.
A. The Health Insurance Industry
The modem health insurance industry evolved slowly through the twentieth
century. Prior to the 1930s, health insurance was something of an anomaly. Health
problems did not qualify for insurance under traditional principles, which based the
provision of insurance on three conditions: (1) the insured event must be definite

might preempt vicarious liability claims for medical malpractice brought against HMOs. See id. at 361.
In Pacificareof Oklahomav. Burrage,59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995), the Tenth Circuit held that vicarious
liability claims against HMOs for medical malpractice do not relate to an employee benefit plan and are
therefore not subject to preemption by ERISA. See id. at 153. In Jass v. PrudentialHealth Care Plan,
88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit held that a claim for medical malpractice brought
against an HMO under the theory of vicarious liability directly relates to an ERISA-governed employee
benefit plan and is preempted. See id, at 1493-94.
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and unambiguous; (2) the insured event must be outside of the insured's control; and
(3) the insured event must be uncommon for individuals but have a predictable
incidence among a group. 5 These conditions made insurance profitable and
publicly acceptable for destructive events of nature such as fires, floods, and storms.
By contrast, heath issues ran contrary to traditional insurance principles. Health
problems were societal mysteries, ambiguous and indefinite." An individual's
health was deemed his own responsibility. Sickness, though not directly within an
individual's control, was left to the personal sphere of family and friends.37 In
addition, health problems were, and still are, common to every individual. For
several reasons, these factors made health coverage unattractive, both as a business
and as a public policy.' The first reason involved the problem of adverse selection
by consumers. Because most people believed that health was a matter within an
individual's control, insurance companies were convinced that those individuals who
purchased health insurance were also those most likely to have health problems. 9
Insurers did not want to engage in what they thought would be a self-defeating
financial risk. Second, there was the problem of how to avoid abuse of the
insurance system. Insurers could not objectively measure the extent of an illness or
curb excessive use of health services." In fact, insurers quickly realized that the
existence of health insurance actually increases utilization of health services.4'
Thus, insurance companies were hesitant to offer health coverage.
The Great Depiession of the 1930s contributed significantly to the growth of
commercial health insurance.42 Individuals could not pay for the health services
they required. Undernourishment led to increased illness, and technological
improvements of the 1920s kept the cost of health care services high.43 President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal failed to address the problems of health care, and
financially strapped communities could not provide needed aid to the poor."
Private hospitals were dramatically affected by the Depression. Average hospital
receipts fell from $236.12 per patient in the mid-1920s to only $59.26 per patient
in 1930.!' Bed occupancy during that same time dropped from 71% to 64%.'
To recover lost income, hospitals and physicians began offering a certain amount
of guaranteed care for a small monthly payment 7 One of the earliest organized

35. See PAUL STAiR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 298 (1982).
36. See id, at 294.
37. See id. at 296.
38. See id. at 294-98.
39. See id. at 294.
40. See id,
41. See it at 298.
42. See id, at 270.
43. See i.
44. See id.
45. See Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and FinancialRisk Shifting:
CompensatingPatients.forHealth Care Cost ContainmentInjuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 1, 11
(1993).
46. See id.
47. See STARR, supra note 35, at 307.
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health plans, the Cooperative Health Association, was established in Oklahoma in1929, by the Farmer's Union and Michael Shadid, M.D. Around the same time,
the American Hospital Association developed Blue Cross plans to help ensure stable
revenues for its members 9 These Blue Cross plans spread quickly, and Blue
Shield plans were soon established to cover physician services.' Private insurance
5
companies soon entered the booming new market of commercial health insurance. '
From the 1930s, the number of individuals covered by health insurance grew
2
steadily. Organized labor drove the expansion of private employee coverage.
Federal measures, such as the GI bill, the Hill-Burton Act, and the creation of a
national health research facility, contributed significantly to an explosion in health
care services and new technology after World War H." In less than a quarter of
a century, the percentage of Americans insured against health costs rose from near
zero to 63%.
B. The Federal Government
The federal government played an important role in the postwar growth of health
insurance. However, the government did not leap full force into the health care
market until 1964, when President Lyndon B. Johnson announced his Great
Society."5 In response to Johnson's mandate, Congress enacted Medicare and
Medicaid to curb two major problems with the private-sector growth of health
insurance s First, most employee-based health insurance ended upon retirement,
leaving the elderly without health insurance at a time when, arguably, they needed
it the most.' Second, private health insurance failed to reach low-income
individuals and families, who were more susceptible to illness than the average
American population due to undernourishment and poor living conditions." These
gaps were filled by Medicare and Medicaid, respectively, and the number of
Americans demanding health care services jumped considerably.'
C. The Necessity of Cost Containment
The growing demand for health care services led to an inevitable rise in the costs
of health care delivery. National spending for health care increased from $12.7
billion to $41.9 billion in 1965 to $647 billion in 1990. Likewise, per capita

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id. at 302-03.
See Randall, supra note 45, at 11.
See STARR, supra note 35, at 307.
See iU.
See id. at 311.
See KAREN DAVIS Er AL, HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT 11 (1990).

54. See

STARR,

supra note 35, at 327.

55. See DAVIS Er AL., supra note 53, at 12.

56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. The creation of Medicare and Medicaid eventually added fifty million consumers to the

health care markeL
60. See BARRY R.

FuRROw Er AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 661 (2d ed.
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spending for medical services skyrocketed from $82 per year in 1950 to $211 in
1965 to $2511 in 1990.1 Additionally, in its first twenty years, Medicare spending
rose from $4.5 billion to $78 billion annually. 2 From 1967 to 1970, Medicare
hospital expenditures grew annually at an average rate of 18.1%.'
The seemingly uncontrollable growth in the costs of health care delivery may be
attributed to several factors. First, as expected, the emergence and growth of health
insurance increased utilization of health services. Second, the progress of
technology spurred cost increases. Health providers used more effective, but more
expensive, methods of health treatment." Improved health care led to longer life,
and an aging population contributed to overall costs as more elderly Americans
required health services. Finally, the steady growth of economic inflation
contributed to rising health costs.
By the early 1970s, cost containment had moved from a mere concern to an
absolute necessity. Both private insurance companies and the federal government
began taking steps to control costs through a practice of utilization management,
which conditions payment for services on a certification of their necessity."
Congress amended Medicare and Medicaid in 1972, giving both programs the
authority to refuse payment for any procedures that were deemed unnecessary to
efficient care.' The Prospective Payment System was established to create an
incentive for hospitals to operate in a more cost-efficient manner by fixing
reimbursement on anticipated health needs and predetermined methods of costefficient treatment. 7
Prospective and concurrent utilization review, as those methods have come to be
called in the modem lexicon of health management, evolved from a system of
diagnosis related groups (DRGs).' The Department of Health and Human Services,
the government agency in charge of Medicare and Medicaid, used DRGs to
categorize individuals according to their diagnoses, age, and health status."
Payment for medical services was made prospectively based upon the anticipated
needs for an individual's DRG. 0 Similar payments were made to hospitals
according to their size, location, and general patient base.7 ' Hospitals and providers

1991).
61. See id.
62. See DAVIS Er PL.. supra note 53, at 13.
63. See id.at 16.
64. See id. at 13.
65. See Paul J. Feldstein, Private Cost Containment: The Effects of Utilization Review Programs
on Health Care Use and Expenditures, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1310, 1311 (1988).
66. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 223, 86 Stat. 1329, 1393
(1972).
67. See Feldstein, supra note 65, at 1311.
68. See DAVIS Er AL.., supra note 53, at 20.

69. See id. at 21.
70. See id. at 35.
71. See id at 36.
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had to absorb any difference between the actual cost of the medical services
provided and the DRG payment. n
During the 1980s, private insurers adopted the prospective and concurrent
methods of utilization review, either by forming internal utilization review
committees or by contracting with independent utilization review organizations.'
Under most prospective and concurrent utilization review systems, subscribers must
request precertification from an insurer for a particular treatment or procedure. The
reviewer compares the treatment requested and the individual's diagnosis with a list
of preapproved diagnoses and recommended treatments. If approved, the patient
generally must justify an overnight hospital stay against another list of
hospitalization criteria and averages for the length of stay required for a particular
treatment. The ultimate decision to approve or disapprove payment for a requested
medical treatment, procedure, or hospital stay usually lies in the hands of a
physician and a medical director, not with the patient's treating physician.
D. Modern Health Management
Health management principles now predominate in the modern health coverage
market 4 Today, nearly every public and private health insurer includes certain
cost-containment measures as part of an integrated health payment plan. These costcontainment mechanisms vary widely, from prospective, concurrent, and retrospective utilization review, to financial incentives that encourage doctors and patients to
restrict utilization of health services. The wide variety and range of available health
management mechanisms have come to rest primarily in two different types of
managed care organizations: the preferred provider organization (PPO) and the
health maintenance organization (HMO).
The PPO is a simple offshoot of the traditional health indemnity model, which
operates on a fee-for-service basis.75 Under a fee-for-service plan, an insurer
collects monthly premiums in exchange for coverage that guarantees reimbursement
of all covered costs that an insured incurs from obtaining medical treatment. The
physician is paid a fee for each service he or she provides. Thus, both the
physician's income and the insurer's costs depend on the number of services
performed and the fee amount associated with each service. Participants in a PPO
pay lower premiums to the organization than they would to a traditional insurer.
The PPO, in turn, contracts with physicians, hospitals, and other medical providers

72. See id.
73. See Alexander M. Capron, Containing Health Care Cost: Ethical and Legal Implications of
Changes in the Method of Paying Physicians,36 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 708, 709 (1986) (discussing
changes in financing of health care delivery).
74. The Institute of Medicine defines "managed care" as "a set of techniques used by or on behalf
of purchasers of health benefits to manage health care by influencing patient care decision making
through case-by-case assessment of the appropriateness of care prior to its provision." John Petrila,
Ethics, Money, and the Problem of Coercion in Managed BehavioralHealth Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J.
359, 363-64 (1996).
75. See Catherine Butler, Note, Preferred Provider Organizations Liability for Physician
Malpractice, 11 Am. J.L. & MED.345, 346 (1985).
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at a predetermined, reduced rate of reimbursement. Consumers are not required to
see these "preferred providers" to obtain medical care, but they are strongly
encouraged to do so through lower deductibles, discounted co-insurance rates, and
higher benefit levels.'
While the legal responsibilities of PPOs to their subscribers are the subject of
some controversy,' the more prevalent and controversial form of managed care
organization is the HMO.' The lMO abandons the traditional fee-for-service
indemnity model in favor of a more controlled structure based on the essential
foundation of cost containment." Although all HMOs employ different methods
of cost containment, all such methods are premised on two primary objectives: (1)
eliminating physicians' incentives to overtreat patients by shifting the financial risk
for such treatment to the medical provider' and (2) coordinating patient utilization
of medical services through a "gatekeeper" - a primary care physician - to
restrict patients' freedom to self-select particular forms of treatment and services.8 '
These two objectives serve as the basic means by which HMOs contain health care
costs and the essential foundations for all cost-containment measures.
Thus, like the ]?PO, the HMO contracts with physicians and other medical
providers. However, the IMO requires its subscribers to call on these contracted
providers in order fo receive coverage. The HMO then makes fixed payments, per
subscriber, to the assigned providers.' For their part, providers must follow
utilization procedures set by the HMO as a condition of participation." In many
cases, an iMO's greater degree of control over the delivery of care blurs the thin
line between an entity that simply pays for health services and an entity that actually
provides health services.

76. See id.
77. See id
78. Because of the degree of control an HMO has over physicians and other providers of medical
care, and its stronger cost-containment measures, the HMO is more prevalent among managed care health
plans. These same characteristics, however, make it controversial to patients and physicians.
79. "An HMO is in organized system of health care delivery for both hospital and physician
services in which care driivery and financing functions are offered by one organization." Randall, supra
note 45, at 20.
80. See id "The trditional HMO structure completely shifts the financial risk from the third-party
payer to the provider. This shift means that HMOs can obtain cost savings by controlling both utilization
and expenses." Id.
81. See id. By placing control over hospital admissions, outpatient procedures, and referrals to
specialists in the hands of a primary care physician, HMOs centralize control over patient utilization. See
id
82. This method of payment is called capitation. Capitation is, in essence, a mechanism for shifting
the risk of overtreatment of services to contracting physicians. Faced with fixed prepayments for each
subscriber, physicians have an incentive to practice cost-efficient medicine.
83. This requirement is generally known as utilization management and comes in three forms: (1)
prospective utilization review, in which providers must precertify each procedure to ensure payment; (2)
concurrent utilization tcview, in which providers must consult with a payment review team during
ongoing treatment; and (3) retrospective utilization review, in which the provider's treatment is reviewed
and payment may be denied. See Vemellia R. Randall et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers: Critiquing
the State Applications, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1069, 1130 (1996).
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The HMO model may be further categorized into three general types: (1) the staff
model; (2) the Independent Practice Association (IPA) model; and (3) the group
model." Each of the three models employs different methods of cost containment
and various levels of organizational control. The staff model HMO directly employs
salaried providers at its own health care facilitiesY Because of its structure, the
staff model HMO generally exercises the greatest amount of control over utilization
and costs. The IPA model HMO is less structured than the staff model. Under the
IPA model, the HMO contracts with an association of physicians to provide services
to HMO subscribers. The members of the physician association utilize their own
facilities and are paid by the association, which is, in turn, reimbursed by the HMO
on a fixed, "capitated" rate for each HMO subscriber. Member physicians also have
the freedom to provide services to non-HMO patients through their own financial
arrangements.86 In contrast, the group model HMO directly contracts with
physicians or groups of physicians, without an intervening association. The HMO
selects each physician, group, or other provider and reimburses or prepays them
directly. Plan subscribers have a limited number of providers within each physician
group to call upon for medical treatment.
These three categories - staff, IPA, and group model HMOs - only serve as
general classifications. Because of the wide variety of cost-containment mechanisms
utilized by HMOs, some organizations include characteristics of two or three models
combined. All three of these general models employ the basic features of capitation
and utilization review. All HMOs also focus on preventive medicine as a means to
less expensive health careY However, some HMOs provide additional risk-sharing
financial incentives, such as bonus or withholding arrangements geared toward
discouraging overutilization of medical services. In addition, H1MOs employ
different methods of utilization review'M either prospectively, concurrently, or
retrospectively.
Although the various managed care organizations are controversial, especially the
HMO, they have all received multiple endorsements from the federal and state
governments. The Federal HMO Act, 9 enacted in 1973, established national
guidelines for the safe and efficient operation of -IMOsY"The HMO Act formally
recognized the various cost-containment measures used by HMOs, including

84. See William A. Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health Care: History and
Prognosis,26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 452 (1991).
85. See id.The staff model HMO uses the strictest control and cost-containment mechanisms, and
is subsequently most controversial of all HMO models. No staff model HMOs operate in Oklahoma.
OKLA. STATE DEP'I OF HEALTH, 1995 ANNUAL REvIEw: HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS 1-2
(1995).
86. See Chittenden, supra note 84, at 452.
87. See DAvis ET AL, supra note 53, at 131. The term "health maintenance organization" was
coined in 1970 to stress managed care's focus on preventive medicine.
88. See Randall et al., supra note 83, at 1130.
89. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222,87 Stat. 914 (1973) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1994)).
90. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1994).
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organizational structures such as the staff, IPA, and group models, 91 capitation
arrangements,' ufilization review mechanisms,' and financial risk-sharing
incentives.' In addition, many state governments have passed their own HMO
Acts.' Some of these state laws characterize HMOs as health care financiers rather
than as health care providers.'4 But the basic premise in every state and federal
HMO Act remains the same: HMOs should be encouraged to operate within the
health care market to promote efficiency and economy.
E. Disputing the PotentialLiability of HMOs
Today, more than sixty million Americans are enrolled in HMOs.' This figure
represents nearly one-third of all Americans who are covered by some form of
health insurance, and is up 60% from only five years ago. 9 In the State of
Oklahoma, HMOs have seen enormous growth. From 1981 to 1995, state
enrollment in HM~s increased from 4,386 to 304,899 Oklahomans."4 The number
of HMOs operating in the state during that same time sprang from one to nine."
0
In 1993, the Oklahoma legislature passed the Health Care Authority Act,"
' which
specifically endorsed "alternative health care delivery systems and strategies for the
procurement of health care services in order to maximize cost-containment."'"
Since the commencement of the Oklahoma Health Care Authority, HMOs operating
in the state have increased their total revenues by over $45 million."
The swift growth of HMOs across the country, fueled by rising health care
costs,"4 has sparked a national debate over the virtues and defects of health

91. See id.§ 300el,)(3)(A).
92. See id.§ 300ewb)(1)(A), (B).
93. See id.§ 300e(c)(6).
94. See i. § 300e(c)(2)(D).
95. See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/1-1 to 125/6-19 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1101-11704 (West 1993); Tax. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 20A.01-.36 (West 1981
& Supp. 1997).
96. The Federal HMO Act defines health maintenance organization as an entity "which provides
basic and supplemental health services to its members." 42 U.S.C. § 300e(a) (1994). By contrast, the
Illinois HMO Act authotizes HMOs to furnish "health care services through providers which are under
contract with or employed by the [HMO]." 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/2-3(c) (West Supp. 1996).
97. See Robert Penr, His Eye on 2d Term, Clinton to Name Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, at
All.
98. See id.
99. See OKLA. STATh DEe'r oF HEALTH, supra note 85, at 3.
100. See id. at 3.
101. Health Care Aithority Act, ch. 332, 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws 1855 (codified as amended at 63
OKLA. STAT. §§ 5003-5022 (Supp. 1997)).
102. 63 OKLA. STAr. § 5003(B)(2) (Supp. 1997).
103. See Okla. State Dep't of Health, Special Health Servs., FinancialReport - QuarterEnding
June 30, 1996 (1996) (oi file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
104. According to the Consumer Price Index for Medical Care, spending for health care in the
United States rose 7.8% in 1993 and 4.8% in 1994. See Richard Rimkunas et al., Congressional
Research Report, Health Care: Price Increasesfor 1995 (1996), abstract available in 1996 WL
11259340. These figure; represent the lowest annual increases in 21 years. See id. Health spending
represents approximately 14% of the nation's gross domestic product. See Richard Price & Richard
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management by HMOs. For some Americans, membership in an HMO means lower
health insurance premiums, reduced medical costs, and a necessary focus on
preventive medicine. For many others, HMOs provoke fears of health rationing,
poor-quality medical care, and a world in which financial considerations take
priority over patient care.
Recent years have seen an explosion of lawsuits in which HMOs have defended
against claims by disgruntled patients who allege that they have been denied access
to quality medical care. These lawsuits are far from uniform. Plaintiffs allege many
different theories of liability, ranging from breach of contract and breach of
warranty to negligence, fraud, and medical malpractice. Each lawsuit has its own
defenses, its own facts, and a maze of legal issues. However, a common thread runs
through every lawsuit against an HMO: Plaintiffs argue that HMOs cause injury by
placing financial considerations ahead of patient care. Thus, every case against an
HMO calls into question the inherent characteristics and policy considerations of
health management.
The flood of suits against HMOs, and the important questions on which they
focus, has engendered a critical debate over the extent to which an HMO should be
held liable for a patient's substandard medical care. The essential role that health
management plays in the delivery of modem health care services has aroused many
different, and often conflicting, public interests. Most consumers place great
significance on patient care and argue that HMOs remain accountable to patients
when they are held liable for patient harm." Physician advocates complain of the
growing control HMOs have over the practice of medicine. 6 These advocates
argue that with control must come responsibility, and that IIMOs should be held
liable for injurious patient care over which they have responsibility.'O° By contrast,
HMOs and large employers contend that potential unlimited liability would cripple
cost-containment mechanisms and force physicians to practice "defensive medicine,"
driving up health care costs. This, in turn, would eliminate the availability of
affordable, long-term coverage for many Americans.'
I1. The Application and Importance of ERISA Preemption
A. ERISA Preemption and its Impact on HMOs
One of the most important and complex facets of the dispute over HMO liability
involves ERISA. More than one-half of all American workers receive their health

Rimkunas, CongressionalResearch Report, Health Care Fact Sheet: 1993 National Health Spending
(1996), abstract available in 1996 WL 9714327.
105. See Frank Bass, Fight Looms over Liability of HMOs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1996, at T4.
106. See id. At least one-third of all medical practitioners have capitated contracts with HMOs.
Capitation accounts for approximately 19% of revenues for doctors with those contracts. Nearly 50%

of all physicians are subject to some form of financial withholding for overutilization of services. See
Julie Johnsson, Trial Focus: Public Unease with PhysicianIncentives, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 12, 1996,

at 1.
107. See Bass, supra note 105, at T4.
108. See id.
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care coverage through ERISA-governed employee benefit plans."9 For several
reasons, HMO subscribers constitute a large and growing percentage of this market.
First, employers with employee welfare benefit plans have increasingly turned to
HMOs as a means of restricting the rising costs of such plans."' Second, HMOs
have actively courted employer-sponsored benefit plans. By contracting with a few
large employers, HMOs are able to access thousands of potential subscribers. Thus,
employee benefit plans offer IMOs easy access to the health care market as well
as a large subscriber base with which to operate. In addition, by cultivating
members through large employee organizations, HMOs avoid the risks of adverse
selection by individual consumers, who might choose a particular health plan on the
basis of a high-risk illness already diagnosed. Third, ERISA has attracted the
participation of IM0s, as it did other insurers and organizations, by allowing them
to escape burdensome and varying state mandates. Thus, a number of factors have
combined to create a situation in which ERISA significantly impacts HMOs by
encouraging their swift expansion into the provision of employee health benefits.
The provision of JIRISA that gives HMOs their greatest advantage is section 514,
commonly known as ERISA's preemption clause.' Pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution,"' any comprehensive federal statute
implicitly preempts state laws that affect similar subjects."' In section 514,
however, Congress explicitly mandated that ERISA "shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan.""" This broad language bars direct state regulation of employee benefit plans
as well as any state laws that, although not directly aimed at the regulation of
employee benefits, relate in their application to ERISA-governed benefit plans. To
restrict the preemptive scope of section 514, Congress included a "savings clause"
that exempts from preemption the law of "any State which regulates insurance,
banking or securities."".5 However, the "deemer clause" in the same section
prohibits states from arbitrarily deeming ERISA-organized plans to be insurance
companies, banks, or trust and investment companies."'
The language of section 514 has been interpreted to preempt a host of state law
claims advanced ageinst HMOs that operate as elements of employee benefit plans.
For example, HMOs have successfully invoked ERISA preemption as a defense to
claims for breach of contract."' Similarly, ERISA has preempted claims against
HMOs for fraud and misrepresentation," 8 breach of fiduciary duty," 9 tortious
109. See Kilcullen, supranote 10, at 9.
110. See id. at 40.
111. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
112. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
113. Implicit preemption turns on the question of whether Congress intended the federal law to
'occupy the field." See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (discussing doctrine of implicit federal preemption).
114. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
115. Id. § 1144(b).
116. See id.§ 1144(b)(2)(B).
117. See, e.g., Kuhl v. Lincoln Natl Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993).
118. See, e.g., Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 505, 509 (10th Cir. 1991); Elsesser v.
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interference with contractual relations, 2° negligence,' and medical malpractice."
Thus, ERISA's preemption clause has extended broad protection to HMOs against
liability under state laws. However, the extent of this protection remains unclear.
One major reason that courts have struggled in vain to provide a definitive test for
ERISA preemption involves the confusion over the term "preemption." As it is used
in the context of ERISA, preemption applies to two distinct legal concepts complete and conflict preemption. These two concepts involve different sections of
ERISA. However, many state and federal courts have confused the two concepts
and misapplied the legal tests involved. Therefore, to apply a more definitive test
for preemption of a claim against an HMO, courts must properly define and
separate the two concepts of complete and conflict preemption.
B. DistinguishingBetween Complete and Conflict Preemption
1. Complete Preemption
The first concept involving the term preemption is the doctrine of "complete
preemption." The complete preemption doctrine is not exclusive to ERISA. Rather,
the doctrine has a broader application arising from the concept of federal removal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441." In general, a claim may not be removed
from state court to federal district court unless diversity of citizenship exists
between the parties to the action," or a federal question is presented on the face
of the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint."2 An exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule is the doctrine of complete preemption, which derives from the
reasoning that "Congress may so completely preempt a particular area that any civil
complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character." 12
Thus, although a plaintiffs complaint may not explicitly state a federal question, it
may implicate a particularly comprehensive federal law that would displace the
plaintiffs state law claims. Such state claims are then said to be completely
preempted by the federal law, allowing removal of the plaintiffs complaint to
federal court.

Hospital of the Phila. College of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
119. See, e.g., Santitoro v. Evans, 935 F. Supp. 733, 736 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
120. See, e.g., Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993).
121. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992).
122. See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1482, 1495 (7th Cir. 1996); Dukes v.
United States Health Care Systems, 848 F. Supp. 39, 42 (E.D. Pa. 1994), rev'd sub nonm Dukes v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
123. Title 28, section 1441 provides that defendants may remove a case from state court to federal
district court if the district court would have original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
124. See id. § 1332.

125. See id. § 1331 (providing that district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States); see also Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,9-12 (1983) (discussing well-pleaded complaint rule).
126. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987).
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The Supreme Court invoked the doctrine of complete preemption in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,' when it held that a plaintiffs common law breach
of contract and tort claims were completely preempted by ERISA.'
The
Metropolitan Life Court reasoned that Congress intended section 502(a) of
ERISA,"' commonly known as ERISA's civil enforcement provision, to be the
exclusive means for a plan participant to recover benefits from an ERISA-govemed
plan.'- Section 502(a) states that "a civil action may be brought.., by a
participant or beneficiary... to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan..'' Thus, whenever a plaintiffs cause
of action falls within the scope of section 502(a), that cause of action is subject to
complete preemption under ERISA."' Moreover, the Metropolitan Life Court
recognized that while the civil enforcement scheme of section 502(a) may displace
a plaintiffs state law claims, the section does not necessarily replace those state
claims with a fedeal remedy.' Therefore, a plaintiffs claims may be subject to
complete preemption even in the absence of a remedy under section 502(a), leaving
the plaintiff with no remedy at all.
As indicated, the doctrine of complete preemption arises in the context of ERISA
when a defendant RHMO removes a plaintiffs state action to federal court. If the
plaintiffs complaint against the HMO only alleges claims that are cognizable under
state law, a court must determine whether: (1) the plaintiff is a participant or
beneficiary of a covered employee benefit plan and thus is eligible to bring a claim
under section 502(a) of ERISA and (2) the plaintiffs state law claim falls within the
subject matter of that section.' To satisfy the second element, a court must
determine that the plaintiffs state law claim rests upon the terms of the ERISAgoverned plan and requires an interpretation of those terms. 3 If the court finds
that both requirements are met by the plaintiffs state law claims, then those claims
are completely preempted, and the action is subject to removal.
A state law claim that is completely preempted under ERISA is not only subject
to removal but also to dismissal. Section 502(a) constitutes the plaintiffs exclusive
remedy for a claim falling within the scope of that section. Thus, a plaintiffs state
law claim that falls within the section's civil enforcement scheme may be removed
by a defendant I-I[O and then dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. If any of the plaintiffs claims against an ERISA-governed

127. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
128. See id. at 62-63.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
130. See MetropolitanLife, 481 U.S. at 63.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
132. See MetropolitanLife, 481 U.S. at 63.
133. See id. at 62-53. The Court held that both claims were completely preempted, even while
noting that only the contract action to recover benefits fell directly under § 502(a). See id.
134. See Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing Supreme Court
jurisprudence on complete preemption under ERISA).
135. See id.at 642
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health plan do not fit within the scope of section 502(a), those claims may not form
the basis of a removal motion, nor may they be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine
of complete preemption."
2. Conflict Preemption
The second concept incorporating the term preemption is what this comment, and
some courts, refer to as "conflict preemption." 37 Even if state law claims are not
completely preempted under ERISA's civil enforcement provision, they may still be
subject to "conflict preemption" under ERISA's preemption clause, section 51413
As indicated earlier in this comment, if a court finds that a plaintiffs state law
claims against an HMO relate to an ERISA-governed health plan within the
meaning of section 514, then the court must dismiss those claims as preempted.'39
Thus, the ultimate effect of both conflict preemption under section 514 and
complete preemption under section 502 is the same: dismissal of the plaintiffs state
law claim. However, a significant difference exists between the two concepts that
has important practical consequences. Complete preemption justifies removal to
federal court and then dismissal of the state law claims. Conflict preemption only
justifies dismissal of those claims. Thus, HMOs that wish to remove cases against
them to federal court must show that the plaintiffs' claims satisfy the standards of
complete preemption under section 502. Proving that a plaintiffs state law claim fits
into the narrow enforcement scheme of section 502 is considerably more difficult
for defendants than proving that the claim "relates to" an ERISA-governed plan
under ERISA's broadly worded preemption clause.
Therefore, it remains important for courts to keep the concepts of complete and
conflict preemption analytically distinct. Unfortunately, courts often confuse
complete and conflict preemption." This confusion has contributed significantly
to the courts' failure to provide a clear test for whether a claim is preempted under
either doctrine.
C. The Legislative Origins of ERISA Preemption
Another major reason why courts have failed to establish a cohesive framework
for interpreting section 514 of ERISA is the lack of a clear direction from Congress.
Ironically, ERISA's preemption of state law claims against HIMOs was an

136. In other words, it is possible for a plaintiff with several state law claims to see one of those
claims form the basis of removal to district court and then be dismissed, while the other claims either
remain in the district court or get remanded back to state court.
137. See Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1487 (7th Cir. 1996) (using term
"conflict preemption" to refer to "ordinary preemption" under § 514).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
139. See Jass, 88 F.3d at 1487.
140. See, e.g. Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 505, 508 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing need
to consider ERISA § 514 to determine if claim is completely preempted for jurisdictional purposes). But
see Elsesser v. Hospital of Phila. College of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
(finding ERISA § 514 inapplicable on reconsideration of motion to remand for lack of federal
jurisdiction).
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unintended consequence that neither Congress nor the health care industry
foresaw." Section 514 essentially altered the balance of power between state and
federal governments and fundamentally affected national health policy, yet Congress
treated the provision as a mere legislative technicality. The preemption clause
initially employed language that simply prevented state legislation about "the subject
matters regulated by this Act."'43 This language sailed through both the Senate and
House of Representatives unchanged, but was amended in a Joint Conference
Committee to mardate preemption of "any and all state laws relating to any
employee benefit plan."'" The Committee disclosed the new language only ten
days before Congress took final action on the bill."
After passage, House and Senate members disagreed on the desirability of the
preemption clause.'" The House sponsor, Rep. John Dent (D.-Pa.), called the
preemption clause the "crowning achievement of the legislation" because it
"eliminated the threat of conflicting and inconsistent state and local regulation."'47
Senate sponsor Jacob Javits (R.-N.Y.) took a different view, suggesting that the
"desirability of further regulation" necessitated a refining of ERISA preemption.'
Sen. Harrison Williams (D.-N.J.), cosponsor of ERISA, was less restrained when
describing the Conference Committee's change of ERISA's preemption language.
Senator Williams suggested in no uncertain terms that the preemption clause was
obviously the result of interest group politics.'49 Despite the varying opinions on
the desirability of the preemption clause, there is little doubt that no member of
Congress could foresee the impact that ERISA preemption would have on the
delivery of health care and specifically on HMOs."5°
D. Supreme Court Interpretationof ERISA Preemption
Congress' inability to foresee the full effects of ERISA preemption prevented it
from providing any meaningful direction for the appropriate interpretation of section
514. In the absence of legislative direction, the basic interpretive guidelines for
determining the scope of ERISA preemption have come from a series of United

141. See Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Semi-Preemption in ERISA: Legislative Processand
Health Policy, 7 AM J. TAX. POL'Y 47,-49 (1988). A Blue Cross Association official recalled that the
health insurance industry failed to notice the significance of ERISA preemption. See id. at 51.
142. See id.
143. H.R. 2, 93d Cong. § 699(a) (1974).
144. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 383 (1974).
145. See id. The C3nference Report to House Bill 2 was released on August 12, 1974. ERISA, as
amended'in Conference, passed in the House of Representatives on August 20, 1974, and in the Senate
on August 22, 1974. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829.

146. See 120 CoNG. REc. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent).
147. lId
148. Id. at 29,942 (statement of Sen. Javits).
149. See id. at 29,933 (statement of Sen. Williams).
150. See Fox & Schaffer, supranote 141, at 52 (noting that neither the Senators nor the staff of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare discussed the implications of preemption with the
members of the House Subcommittee on Health).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol49/iss4/5

1996]

COMMENTS

States Supreme Court decisions.' Unfortunately, these decisions have failed to
provide a consistent analytical framework for lower courts to follow.
The Supreme Court has focused on one basic question in all of its ERISA
preemption cases: When does a state law "relate to" employee benefit plans? To
answer this question, the Court has spent the vast majority of its time defining the
words "relate to." Early cases interpreting this vague terminology relied on a "value
neutral" approach, in which the Court attempted to replace "relate to" with more
definitive language of its own. By using this approach, the Court avoided the need
to analyze the state law at issue or the constitutional and policy implications of
ERISA preemption. Instead, the Court concentrated on a textual interpretive analysis
of the language used by Congress.'
The benchmark case using the value neutral, textualist approach to interpreting
ERISA's preemption clause is Shaw v. Delta Air Lines." In Shaw, the Supreme
Court applied ERISA to preempt New York's Human Rights and Disability Benefits
Laws, which prohibited sex discrimination in employment and required employers
to pay sick leave benefits to employees who were temporarily disabled or
pregnant." The Shaw Court began its analysis by stating that it must decide
whether the state laws 'relate to' employee benefit plans within the meaning of
§ 514(a)."'55 From this point, the Court focused solely on the meaning of "relate
to" and avoided any analysis of the state laws and their effect on employee benefit
plans.
Specifically, the Shaw Court noted that "Congress used the words 'relate to' in
§ 514(a) in their broad sense," concluding that a narrower interpretation of these
words would make subsequent provisions of section514 superfluous. 56 The Court
also provided an analysis of ERISA preemption's brief legislative history to support
its reasoning that Congress must have intended an expansive interpretation of that
clause. " Finally, the Shaw Court relied upon Black's Law Dictionaryto find that
a state "law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase,
if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."'5 Under this broad
interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause, the Court had "no difficulty in
concluding that the Human Rights Law and Disability Benefits Law 'relate to'
employee benefit plans."'5 "
The expansive interpretation offered by Shaw promised little certainty in
interpretation of section 514. The words "connection with or reference to" in Shaw

151. The Supreme Court has written thirteen opinions on the scope of ERISA preemption. See supra
note 22.
152. For a more in-depth discussion of the textualist approach to ERISA preemption, see generally
Fisk, supra note 7.
153. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).

154.
155.
156.
157.

See id. at 108.
Xd.at 96.
Id. at 98.
See id. at 98-99.

158. Id. at 96-97
159. l at 96.
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are no more clear than the ambiguous terminology of the statute itself. The Shaw
Court recognized that the scope of ERISA preemption was limited when it noted
that "[s]ome state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote,
or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan.'"
However, the Court failed to define when a law's effect would be too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral to justify preemption. In fact, the Shaw Court made no
attempt at all to analyze the state laws at issue or judge their impact on employee
benefit plans. Despite the uncertainty that was apparent in the Court's application
of section 514, Shaw marked the beginning of an expansive approach to determining
the scope of ERISA preemption - one which centered entirely on interpreting the
text of section 514 and ignored the actual impact of challenged state laws upon
employee benefit plans or the policy implications of federal preemption.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its broad interpretation of section 514 in PilotLife
Insurance Company v. Dedeaux.'6 ' The Pilot Life Court held that ERISA
preempted the Mississippi common law tort of bad faith when it was applied against
a self-funded employee health plan." The Court further held that the bad faith
claim was not exempted from ERISA preemption as a regulation of insurance."
In its reasoning, the Pilot Life Court noted that, to be exempted from ERISA
preemption under the insurance exception of the savings clause, a state law must not
only "have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically directed
toward that industry."'" The Pilot Life Court reconfirmed the Shaw Court's broad
reading of ERISA preemption and found that the plaintiffs state law claims were
unquestionably preempted.'" Indeed, the Pilot Life Court reasoned that any
common law tort or contract action seeking damages for improper processing of a
benefits claim would be preempted by ERISA."
The Supreme Court appeared to depart from its broad interpretation of ERISA
preemption in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 67 when it held that ERISA did
not preempt a state law that required large employers to provide a one-time
severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing.'" While the Fort
Halifax Court initially relied on the expansive language of Shaw and PilotLife, the
Court also analyzed the state statute at issue and found that it did not raise "the
types of concerns, that prompted preemption."'" Specifically, the Fort Halifax
Court reasoned that "Congress intended preemption to afford employers the
advantages of a uniform set of administrative procedures governed by a single set

160. Id. at 100 n.21.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

481 U.S. 41 (1987).
See id. at 47.
See id. at 51.
Id. at 50.
See id. at 47-48.
See id.
482 U.S. 1 (1987).
See id. at 4.
Id. at 11.
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of administrative regulations."'7 0 The state statute did not require or interfere with
the administration of a benefit plan and, consequently, did not implicate the congressional purpose behind ERISA's preemption clause.'
Fort Halifax represents a more narrow approach to determining ERISA
preemption than the framework which emerged from Shaw and PilotLife. The Fort
HalifaxCourt looked beyond a basic, textual interpretation of section 514 to analyze
the state law and its impact on employee benefit plans." The Court recognized
that a state law does not relate to an employee benefit plan simply through its
connection with or reference to employee benefits but requires a careful examination
of its purpose and effect with regard to the administration of benefit plans."
Thus, the Fort Halifax Court reasoned that the scope of ERISA preemption is
ultimately limited by the underlying purpose behind Congress' passage of section
514.
However, like Shaw and PilotLife, the FortHalifax Court failed to clearly define
the limitations that it found in section 514. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court
returned to a broad interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause. For instance, the
Court in FMC Corp. v. Holliday" held that ERISA preempted a state motor
vehicle law that precluded reimbursement for benefit payments from a claimant's
tort recovery.'75 The FMC Corp. Court reasoned that the law referred to employee
benefit plans in its statutory language and had a connection with benefit plans in its
application." A similarly broad application of ERISA preemption resulted in
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,"7 in which the Court found that a plaintiffs suit
The Court reasoned that
for wrongful discharge was preempted by ERISA.
because the plaintiff claimed that his employer fired him to prevent his pension
from vesting, the plaintiffs lawsuit related "not merely to pension benefits, but to
the essence of the pension plan itself."'"
The Court in District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade"s
provided the most expansive application of section 514 when it held that ERISA
preempted a workers' compensation statute which required employers who provided
health insurance for their employees to provide equivalent coverage to injured
employees."' According to the Court, section 514 applied to the statute because it
set compensation levels for injured employees' health coverage by reference to the
amount of benefits each employer pays to full-time employees."n

170.

I.

171. See id.
172.
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175.
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177.
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180.

See id.
See id.
498 U.S. 52 (1990).
See id.at 59.
See id.
498 U.S. 133 (1990).
See id. at 139.
Id. at 140.
506 U.S. 125 (1992).

at 130.
181. See id.
182. See id.
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GreaterWashington Boardof Trade, Ingersoll-Rand,FMC Corp., PilotLife, and
Shaw reflect an expansive interpretation of section 514 centered upon a valueneutral, plain meaning approach to the words "relate to" of the preemption clause.
However, Fort Halifax represents a narrower approach based on the rationale that
ERISA's preemptiDn clause has implicit limits grounded in the policy implications
of preemption. T-e Supreme Court returned to these implicit limits in 1995 when
it decided New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co."
In Travelers, a New York statute required hospitals to collect surcharges from
patients covered by commercial insurers and from certain HMOs.'u Several
commercial insurers and HMOs challenged the validity of the state law, arguing that
the law interfered with the administrative decision making of ERISA-governed
employee benefit plans and imposed significant costs on such plans." Both the
district court and United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with
this argument and held that the New York law related to employee benefit plans
under the Supreme Court's prior interpretation of section 514 and was preempted
by ERISA.'6
The Supreme Court reyersed and held that the law was not subject to ERISA
preemption.'
The Travelers Court began its analysis by recognizing that
Congress must have intended section 514 to retain certain limits for the phrase
"relate to" to have: any substantive meaning." The Court indicated that its prior
attempts to construe the phrase "relate to" were of little help in determining the
limitations of ERISA's preemption clause, noting that the statute at issue made no
"reference to" employee benefit plans, and that the phrase "connection with" was
as unhelpful as the phrase "relate to" in determining the scope of section 5142"
Ultimately, the Court reasoned that state laws which only affect the costs of
providing employee benefits, and therefore exert an indirect economic influence on
the administration of benefit plans, do not fall within the reach of ERISA's
preemption clause."9
The reasoning in Travelers is significantly more narrow than the Court's
traditionally expansive interpretation of section 514. However, the Supreme Court
may have further confused lower courts by disclaiming in Travelers the analytical
approach that it had developed in previous cases. A number of ERISA preemption
cases decided afte~r Travelers do not even mention the case, but rely instead on
interpretive analyses firmly grounded in the Shaw approach.' Unfortuntely,

183. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
184. See id. at 1673.
185. See id. at 1676.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id at 1677.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 1679.
191. See Jass v. Pnidential Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1482, 1493 (7th Cir. 1996); Pacificare of Okla.
v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 153-54 (10th Cir. 1995).
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analyses based on the Shaw approach are far from "firm" when they are applied to
claims against HMOs. The following sections discuss the inadequacy of the current
interpretive frameworks based on Shaw and then return to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Travelers to propose a new, more definitive framework for determining
the scope of ERISA preemption.
E. Deceptive and Artificial Tests for Preemption
In an attempt to develop a manageable framework from Shaw's expansive
interpretation of section 514, courts that have addressed subscriber claims against
HMOs have developed a number of deceptive and artificial tests for determining
whether ERISA preempts such claims. These tests may be grouped into three major
types: (1) a quality of care versus denial of benefits classification; (2) a direct
versus indirect claim classification; and (3) a physical versus nonphysical loss
classification. The following section examines these three types of tests and explains
how they have become an obstacle to elucidation of a definitive test for ERISA
preemption.
1. Claims Based on Quality of Care Versus Claims Based on Denial of
Benefits
Under a quality of care versus denial of benefits theory of claim classification,
courts have reasoned that ERISA was only intended to secure the right of
employees to receive benefits promised to them under an employee benefit plan.
These courts reason that ERISA was not intended to guarantee a certain standard
within the medical profession. Thus, claims against an HMO that are based on a
complaint about the delivery of substandard medical care are not preempted by
ERISA, while claims arising from an HMO's refusal to pay for that medical care
would be preempted as an alleged improper denial of benefits. As this comment
will show through a review of case law, the quality of care versus denial of benefits
classification may or may not result in a finding of preemption, depending on which
type of preemption doctrine is being considered (complete or conflict preemption)
and under which legal theory the plaintiff chooses to characterize her claim.
Additionally, the distinction between a claim based on a substandard quality of
care and one founded on an improper denial of benefits is often hazy and difficult
for courts to determine. For example, it is reasonable to argue that an HMO's
prospective or concurrent utilization review decision to deny payment for a
requested medical treatment directly affects a physician's medical determination of
whether to proceed with the treatment, and, thus, that prospective or concurrent
utilization review affects the quality of care provided. Yet these de facto medical
determinations are also benefit decisions. Some courts may find that claims arising
from utilization review decisions are preempted as claims for an improper denial of
benefits, while other courts reject ERISA preemption on the basis that the claim is
really one for the delivery of substandard medical care. Thus, the quality of care
versus denial of benefits classification is inadequate for forming a determinative test
for ERISA preemption.
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2. Direct Versus Indirect Claims
Under another general classification theory, courts have attempted to define the
scope of ERISA by distinguishing state claims that directly implicate an ERISAgoverned health plan from those claims that only affect such plans indirectly. This
reasoning derives from a statement made by the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines," which recognized that a state law is not subject td ERISA preemption
if it affects employee benefit plans in "too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner
to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan."' " Thus, courts weigh the
degree to which a legal claim invades the realm of ERISA, finding some claims
sufficiently invasive to justify preemption and others too remote to qualify.
The direct versus indirect theory of classifying claims hardly seems adequate, for
it leaves many important questions unanswered. Where do the boundaries of ERISA
lie when analyzing claims against HMOs, which were unforeseen elements of
employee benefit plans when Congress drafted the statute? What degree of
invasiveness is required before a claim is no longer tenuous, remote, or peripheral
to an ERISA plan? In addition, it seems that a direct versus indirect classification
might incorporate a classification based on the quality of care versus denial of
benefits distinction. A claim based on the quality of care might also be said to have
only an indirect effect on an ERISA plan. Moreover, the Travelers Court explicitly
recognized that ERISA might preempt state laws that indirectly affect employee
benefit plans if the effects were sufficiently acute to interfere with administration
of those plans.' ]Despite the Supreme Court's recognition that ERISA might
preempt direct and indirect claims alike, courts have continued to rely on the direct
versus indirect distinction as a manageable approach to determining ERISA
preemption.
3. Physical Versus Nonphysical Loss
At least one legal scholar has suggested a third general theory for classifying
claims used by the courts - a classification based on physical versus nonphysical
"
loss. 95
' Under this theory, courts group claims for recovery from physical injury
apart from those claims seeking recovery for economic loss. The former would not
be subject to ERISA preemption, while the latter group would be preempted by
ERISA. The premise underlying this theory is twofold. First, ERISA provides a
remedy for economic loss of benefits through its civil enforcement scheme, while
recovery for physicad injuries is not provided for under ERISA. Second, courts are
less inclined under equitable considerations to find a claim preempted when the
plaintiff has suffered physical injury or loss than when a plaintiffs damages are
merely financial. Thus, state law claims seeking recovery for economic damage are

192.
193.
194.
195.

463 U.S. 85 (1983).
Id.at 100 n.21
See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1683.
See Chittenden, supra note 84, at 486-92.
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more likely to be preempted by ERISA than claims for recovery from physical

injury.
Several problems exist with the physical versus nonphysical loss classification.
First, it is unsupported by case law. Few courts have explicitly considered whether
or not a plaintiffs claim was related to physical injuries or economic damages."
Indeed, many of the courts that have faced a claim for physical injuries have found
that ERISA preemption still applies.' Second, the existence of a federal remedy
is not a requirement for preemption of a state claim.'98 Third, the conduct
producing the injury remains the same, regardless of whether that injury is physical
or economic. Therefore, it must be argued that if ERISA governs a claim
concerning economic loss resulting from an HMO's conduct, then ERISA should
also govern identical conduct that results in physical injury."9 Thus, the usefulness
of the physical versus nonphysical loss distinction is severely limited in determining
ERISA preemption of claims against HMOs.
F. The Need for a Review of ERISA Preemption
Clearly, a new approach to determining ERISA preemption is needed. From the
beginning, courts have entangled the two separate concepts of complete and conflict
preemption. In addition, courts have invented deceptive and artificial classifications
for claims to simplify the issue of ERISA preemption. The result is a myriad of
confusion: Does a claim relate to the quality of care provided under a plan or to a
denial of plan benefits? Is the claim directly related to the plan or does it affect the
plan in only an indirect way? Did the allegedly improper activity forming the basis
for the claim result in physical injury or economic loss? The obvious confusion in
the courts over which of these questions to ask and what answers to accept has
served to erode the public trust of HMOs, government, and the judicial system.
Justice Stevens recognized the devastating effects of the chaos surrounding ERISA
preemption in his dissenting opinion in Districtof Columbia v. GreaterWashington
Board of Trade. Justice Stevens noted the existence of over 2800 judicial
opinions addressing ERISA preemption and suggested the need for a fresh look at
the scope of ERISA's preemption clause."°
IV. Travelers: Clearing the Pathfor a New Approach to ERISA Preemption
A. The Travelers Approach
Although it has not magically cleared the confusion surrounding interpretation
of section 514, Travelers provides the starting point from which a fresh approach
to determining ERISA preemption may emerge. The Travelers Court implicitly

196.
plaintiffs
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

But see Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 505, 509 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that
claim arose from death of husband, not a claim seeking benefits).
See id.
See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52-56 (1987).
See Chittenden, supra note 84, at 488.
506 U.S. 125, 135 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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disclaimed the expansive view supported in past cases.' Moreover, the Court
clearly indicated a preference toward nonpreemption of state laws that fall within
areas traditionally regulated by the states, " including general health care
regulation.' Most importantly, however, the Travelers Court suggested a new
borderline for the scope of ERISA preemption.
According to Travelers, state laws that mandate employee benefit structures or
their administraticn, or which provide alternative enforcement mechanisms to
recover benefits, sufficiently relate to ERISA to trigger section 514.0 These
state laws need noP constitute a direct regulation of ERISA plans, for "a state law
might produce such acute, albeit indirect effects ...as to force an ERISA plan
to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice
of insurers."' Under the reasoning in Travelers, state laws with such an effect
on employee benefit plans would likely be subject to ERISA preemption."
B. The FirstStep to a New Framework: Defining the Benefit
Thus, according to Travelers, courts must determine whether, directly or
indirectly, a state law forces a plan to adopt (or disclaim) a certain employee
benefit structure, mandates a method of plan administration, or circumvents
ERISA's enforcement mechanisms. The first step to applying this new approach
to claims against HMOs requires an understanding that HMOs are not, in
themselves, "employee benefit plans." In many cases, an HMO is simply the
means by which an employee benefit plan provides health care coverage to its
members. Even when an HMO is designated as a plan administrator or fiduciary,
state laws that affect the HMO do not necessarily relate to the plan itself." In
addition, the medical care provided to HMO subscribers is not the "benefit"
secured by ERISA. The benefit provided by an employee benefit plan is
affordable health care coverage for specified medical expenses. In effect, the
benefit is membership in the HMO. The following discussion sets forth the
rationale behind these two assertions.
1. Why the HMO Is Not the Employee Benefit Plan
Under ERISA, an "employee welfare benefit plan" includes "any plan, fund, or
program... established or maintained by an employer or by an employee

202. See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1677 ("That said, we have to recognize that our prior attempt to

construe the phrase 'relate to' does not give us much help in drawing the line here.").
203. See id. at 1676.
204. See id. at 1680 ("[Nothing in the language of [section 514] or the context of its passage
indicates that Congress chose to displace general health care regulation, which historically has been a
matter of local concern.').
205. See id. at 1678.
206. Id. at 1683.
207. See id.
208. This fact is seen most clearly in Travelers. The HMOs in that case were named plan
fiduciaries, yet the Tratelers Court held that the state surcharge imposed on these entities was not
preempted by ERISA. Fee id. at 1679. Thus, the designation of an HMO as a plan administrator or
fiduciary is not controlling in a determination of ERISA preemption of a claim against it.
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organization, or by both ... for the purpose of providing for its participants or
their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits." 2' ERISA plans are nonprofit, tax-exempt
entities. By contrast, HMOs are independent organizations that are generally
organized as for-profit corporations. HMOs are not established by employers or
employee organizations pursuant to ERISA. Rather, HMOs emerged in the
nation's health care system as an alternative to traditional health insurance. With
this in mind, it becomes clear that HMOs are not the plans themselves but,
instead, are the "otherwise"
that Congress referred to in the above definition of
210
an employee benefit plan.
In Travelers, the Supreme Court recognized the distinction between ERISA
plans and HMOs that operate in conjunction with those plans. The Court held that
ERISA did not preempt a New York law imposing a surcharge on HMOs
operating as elements of employee benefit plans.2" In fact, the Travelers Court
explicitly noted that plans may "purchase insurance policies or HMO memberships." ' State laws that impose costs or otherwise affect HMOs do not
automatically relate to an employee benefit plan, but might simply affect the
purchasing decisions of such plans.2" 3 However, the Travelers Court also
recognized that a state law affecting HMOs "might produce such acute, albeit
indirect, economic effects ... as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain
scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers."2 '4
Any state law that produced such effects might be preempted under section
514."5 Thus, an effective preemption analysis cannot end with the conclusion
that the defendant HMO is not the employee benefit plan. Courts must also
analyze whether the state law claim relates to the plan established by the
employer to provide benefits. Such an analysis requires a careful interpretation
of the "benefit" in an employee benefit plan.
2. Why the Benefit Is Membership in the HMO
The term "benefit" is never explicitly defined in ERISA. ERISA does not
mandate that employees provide specific payments or services to employees, or
that they provide any benefits at all. Employers have the discretion to determine
if and what benefits they choose to offer. Consequently, the "benefit" has been
difficult for courts to define. HMOs argue that the health benefit in an employee
benefit plan is the actual medical care provided to plan participants. 6 On the
other hand, plaintiffs argue that the health benefit is affordable health care

209. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
210. See id.
211. See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1676.
212. Id at 1679.
213. See id.
214. Id at 1683.
215. See id.
216. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 1995); Robert Pear, HMOs
Asserting Immunity in Suits over Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at Al.
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coverage secured through membership in an HMO.2 ' This latter interpretation
of the term benefit is supported by the United States Department of Labor, the
agency in charge of ERISA enforcement, which argued for this interpretation as
amicus curie in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,Inc."' The agency contended that
"lIMOs are separate from... ERISA plans and that the sole benefit that
participants
and beneficiaries receive from each plan is... membership in the
1' 9

HMOs.

2

The rationale behind the Labor Department's interpretation of benefit is
supported by the text of ERISA and its plain meaning. First, in ERISA's opening
section, Congress stated its finding that "the soundness and stability of plans with
respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered."' This
statement suggests an understanding of the term "benefit" in its financial sense.
Employers establish plans to provide important benefits such as pensions funds,
funds to pay for accidental death, accident, or disability, and funds to pay for
necessary health care. Thus, through financial benefits, plans provide participants
with important security against injury, age, and loss of work.
In addition, the civil enforcement provision of ERISA also indicates that the
term "benefit," with regard to claims against HMOs, is best defined as health care
coverage secured through HMO membership,' Section 502 allows a plan
participant to bring an action under the statute "to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or
to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan."2 If benefits
are defined as medical care, as HMOs argue, then section 502 would allow plan
participants to bring state medical malpractice claims into federal court. ERISA
would preempt innumerable state laws relating to medical care simply because
that care was provided pursuant to an employee benefit plan. The interpretation
urged by HMOs would thus result in preemption of an area that has historically
and traditionally been left to the states. As the Supreme Court has noted, such an
effect cannot be justified unless "that was the clear and manifest purpose of

Congress."'
If the benefit is defined as HMO membership, however, then section 502
provides plan participants with a remedy for loss of promised health care
coverage. In this respect, it is important to remember that Congress intended to
provide for the financial stability of workers. Congress drafted ERISA to ensure
that plan participants would have financial security, not to mandate a certain
national standard for the provision of insurance, the quality of medical care, or
the regulation of securities.tm Thus, the plain meaning of the term "benefit" and
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
Ct. 1671,
224.

See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356.
See id.
I1&
29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
See id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
Id
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S.
1676 (1995).
In fact, ERISA's preemption clause specifically exempts state laws that regulate insurance,
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the legislative history behind the statute support an interpretation that would
define the term as health care coverage secured by membership in an HMO.
This reading is also consistent with the idea that ERISA extends protection to
all participants equally. Thus, a plan participant who chooses to participate in a
traditional indemnity plan provided by the employer has the same ERISAenforced benefits as the HMO subscriber - the right to receive contracted health
insurance provided by an entity funded through the plan. Clearly, the health
benefits provided to an employee who has chosen to utilize traditional health
insurance are the funds to purchase such insurance and the coverage received.
Likewise, the health benefits available to an employee who has chosen to
subscribe to an HMO is the health coverage guaranteed by membership in the
HMO. Thus, the term "benefit" is best defined as HMO membership.
C. A Manageable Framework: Intrinsic Versus Singular Claims
The proposed interpretations of the terms "employee benefit plan" and "benefit"
would not alter the statutory language of ERISA, nor would they change the
substantive rights of any plan sponsor or beneficiary. However, they would
clarify the scope of ERISA preemption in the context of subscriber actions against
HMOs. Moreover, the proposed interpretations would serve to: (1) bind the two
concepts of complete and conflict preemption in the context of claims against
HMOs and (2) eliminate the artificial classifications invented by courts to
determine ERISA preemption of claims against HMOs. Ultimately, the proposed
interpretations would provide a single, unified test for preemption. Under that one
test, ERISA would preempt state law claims that challenge the inherent structure
of HMOs, while claims that focus on the particularized actions of a single HMO
would escape the defense of ERISA preemption. This comment refers to the
former type of state law claim as an "intrinsic claim" and the latter type of claim
as a "singular claim."
As previously indicated, the doctrine of complete preemption would justify the
removal and dismissal of any state law claim that fell within the scope of
ERISA's civil enforcement provision.'m This provision, section 502, allows plan
m
participants to recover benefits due to them under the terms of their plans.' By
defining the term "benefit" as the coverage secured by HMO membership, section
502 would completely preempt any state law claim that attempts to recover the
rights of membership in an HMO. In this respect, the rights of HMO membership
are defined by two basic elements: (1) the HMO subscriber contract with the Plan
and (2) the cost-containment structure inherent in all HMOs.
For example, a contract between plan members and their HMO usually
indicates what medical services are covered under the terms of the HMO
membership agreement. Thus, the subscriber contract defines the rights of HMO
membership with regard to specific types of covered medical care. Similarly,

banking or securities from its scope. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
225. See supratext accompanying notes 123-36.
226. See 29 U.S.C § 1132(a) (1994).
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plans purchase HMO coverage for their members because of the cost-containment
structure inherent in all HMOs. As mentioned earlier, the essential purpose
behind HMOs is to contain costs by preventing physician overtreatment and
patient overutilization. The necessity of these central objectives requires that all
HMOs be structured to retain a certain degree of control over the provision of
medical care. Thus, cost-control measures such as utilization review and financial
risk-sharing arrangements typify the inherent structure of HMOs.
The rights of HMO membership are defined by this structure, for a member
may not receive coverage for health care that is not provided by an HMO
physician, or is not certified by a claims administrator. Thus, complete
preemption would only apply to those state law claims that arise from the
subscriber contract or that challenge the inherent structure of HMOs. The doctrine
would not apply to those claims which simply allege that particular, individualized
actions of an HMO were improper.
A similar analysis can be applied to conflict preemption under section 514.
Once it is clear that ERISA only preempts those state laws that relate to a plan's
provision of health care coverage through HMO membership, it becomes clear
that conflict preemption only applies to state law claims that challenge the nature
and rights of that membership. In this respect, the nature and rights of HMO
membership are defined just as they were above, by an IMO's subscriber contract
and the inherent structure of HMOs in general. Therefore, the proposed
interpretations of ERISA would lead to a single test for both complete and
conflict preemption based on those intrinsic claims that challenge the inherent
structure of HMOs. Singular claims - those state law claims that focus on the
allegedly improper activities of a single HMO - would not be preempted by
ERISA.
V. Analyzing the Claims Against HMOs and ERISA
Preemption of Those Claims
The distinction between singular claims and intrinsic claims may not be
immediately clear. However, a review of the various legal claims advanced
against HMOs reveals the logic and rationale behind the proposed framework.
The following section examines the numerous theories of liability under which
plaintiffs have sued their HMOs and discusses the application of ERISA
preemption to each type of claim under both the traditional interpretive analyses
and the framework proposed by this comment.
A. Breach of Contract Claims
1. Theories of ContractualLiability
Numerous courts have addressed breach of contract claims leveled against
HMOs by injured patients. These claims are by no means uniform among the
litigation on this issue. To the contrary, plaintiffs have alleged a number of
different theories to support their breach of contract claims. While courts have
held that the vast majority of these claims are preempted by ERISA, the
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traditional preemption analyses differ significantly according to the contractual
theories advanced by plaintiffs. Thus, a discussion of the various theories of
contractual liability is important to understanding preemption of these claims.
a) Failureto Provide Access to Quality Medical Care
Under the first and most frequently used breach of contract theory, a plaintiff
may allege that her HMO breached its contractual duty to provide access to
quality medical services.' The plaintiff must first show that her subscriber
contract with the HMO expressly or impliedly requires a certain standard of
quality medical care. The plaintiff must then prove that the treatment she received
through her HMO failed to meet the required standards of quality. Finally, the
plaintiff must show that the substandard quality of care that was provided
proximately caused her injuries. These last two elements pose an obvious barrier
to recovery and plague many breach of contract claimants.'
b) Failureto Provide Coverage
A second theory on which plaintiffs rest their breach of contract claims
involves an HMO's failure to provide the coverage required under its subscriber
contract.' The plaintiff bears a lighter burden of proof under this theory than
under a contractual claim dealing with the quality of medical care. However,
there are several important limitations to this type of contractual claim. First, this
theory only operates under a specific set of facts - those in which a patient pays
for treatment out of her own pocket and then sues to recover for the economic
loss. Few patients can afford to risk paying for their treatment with the scant
hope that they might later recover from their HMO in the courts. Second, a
plaintiff must still overcome the deference that courts give to medical experts. An
HMO employing physicians to perform its utilization review has the advantage
of this traditional deference in arguing that the plaintiffs treatment was not truly
necessary. Thus, a plaintiff bringing a claim for failure to provide contractual
coverage must come forward with credible medical experts to refute the HMO's
denial of certification. This places severe evidentiary and financial limitations on
plaintiffs.

227. See McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org., 604 A.2d 1053, 1062 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(holding that plaintiff stated breach of contract claim against HMO by alleging that HMO failed to
provide subscriber with qualified primary care physician).
228. See Steineke v. Share Health Plan, 518 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Neb. 1994) (granting summary
judgment against breach of contract plaintiff who failed to prove that HMO's requirement that surgery
be performed in approved hospital proximately caused injuries).
229. See Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Patrick D. Seiter, Health Plan Liability in the Age of Managed
Care, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 191, 193 (1995) (discussing Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Riverside County 1993). The plaintiff in Fox successfully relied on a breach of contract claim against
an HMO that provided health care coverage to public employees. The HMO had denied precertification
of the plaintiffs requested bone marrow transplant on the grounds that the treatment was investigational.
The plaintiff and her husband proceeded with the transplant, paid for it with their own funds, and then
brought suit against the HMO. A jury awarded the plaintiff and her husband approximately $89 million.
The HMO appealed, but the case was settled prior to appellate review. See id.
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c) Failure to Deal in Good Faith
A third breach of contract theory addresses an HMO's failure to follow
established procedures when handling a subscriber's claim. Courts have generally
recharacterized this narrow contractual theory as a claim for failure to deal in
good faithY' Bad faith claims against insurance companies provide two
characteristics favorable to plaintiffs. First, bad faith claims are familiar to courts
and, thus, easier to litigate. Second, although these claims sound in contract, they
support tort recovery of punitive damagesY
However, under bad faith claims, a plaintiff must come forward with evidence
of more than a "mere omission to perform a contract obligation.""2 Instead, the
plaintiff must show a breach of "a. positive legal duty" through a course of
conduct by an HMO that evidences a disregard for its contractual duties to a
subscriber. 3 This evidentiary burden limits bad faith claims to relatively few
factual situations.
d) Subscribers as Third-Party Beneficiaries
A fourth theory supporting contractual liability against HMOs involves third
party enforcement of HMO-physician agreements, or group master contracts
between HMOs and employers. Under this theory, subscribers, as third-party
beneficiaries, may state a cause of action in contract when an HMO-physician
agreement or group master contract provides contractual assurances of quality
medical care and that quality care is not provided.' This theory gives plaintiff
subscribers more leeway to bring suit against their HMOs. However, a third party
beneficiary claim also compels the same evidentiary burdens as a straightforward
breach of contract claim involving the quality of care." 5
e) Breach of Warranty
A fifth theory of liability arising out of an HMO's contract with its subscribers
is breach of warranty.' Under a breach of warranty theory, an HMO may be
held liable to subscribers injured by poor quality medical care if the organization
warranted a higher quality of medical services than it actually provided."'
Generally, plaintiffs bringing a warranty claim point to representations in an

230. See Williams v. HealthAmerica, 535 N.E.2d 717, 722 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (finding material
issue of fact on plaintif's breach of contract claim as to whether HMO handled insured's claim in good
faith).
231. Bad faith insurance claims involve questions of contractual duty and breach of that duty. The

difference lies with the tortious intent of an insurer when breaching its contract with an insured.
232. Williams, 535 N.E.2d at 721.
233. See id. at 72C-21.
234. See i. at 722.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 227-28.
236. See Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
237. See Depenbrck v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 144 Cal. Rptr. 724, 726 (Ct. App. 1978).
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HMO's promotional literature that "guarantee" or "assure" a high standard of
quality medical serviceY
Generally, warranty claims are infrequent and inadequate methods of recovery
against HMOs. Seldom are health care providers considered guarantors of medical
treatment; physicians rarely warrant a cure or assure a specific result. 9 In fact,
the court in Pulvers v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan' recognized that the
language upon which the plaintiffs relied for their breach of warranty theory
amounted to nothing "more than ... generalized puffing to the effect that the
Foundation's doctors would exercise good judgment in their care."' As Pulvers
suggests, few courts are likely to entertain a warranty cause of action against an
HMO unless the organization's literature or agents expressly guarantee a specific
and unequivocal outcome.
2. TraditionalPreemptionAnalysis of Claims for Breach of Contract
An analysis of the five contractual theories discussed above reveals the folly
behind the various classifications currently used by courts to determine the scope
of ERISA preemption. With regard to breach of contract claims, the classification
based on quality of care versus denial of benefits is virtually identical to a
classification based on physical versus economic loss. For example, in a situation
whereby a patient abides by an HMO's prospective coverage decision, she may
subsequently suffer physical injury as a result of substandard medical care. The
patient might then bring a breach of contract or warranty claim, and the court
could classify that claim either under a quality of care analysis or under a
physical injury theory. Under either of these classifications, the plaintiffs claim
relates to subject matter outside the scope of ERISA and would not be preempted.
Likewise, if a patient disagrees with an HMO's certification of coverage decision
and ventures beyond the HMO to receive quality medical care at her own
financial risk, then her subsequent contractual claim would seek recovery for an
improper denial of benefits or economic loss. ERISA would preempt her claim
under either classification.
Thus, application of these two classification theories to contractual claims
seems fundamentally opposed to the very concept of health coverage, which stems
from the idea that a third party will share the financial risk of an uncontrollable
and potentially damaging event. Under the scenario outlined above, HMO
subscribers who are forced to abandon the safety net of health coverage to protect
their own health would be prevented from recovering from the very entities who
agreed to bear the financial risk of providing such treatment. In addition,
conditioning ERISA preemption on such artificial distinctions invites plaintiffs to
artfully plead their breach of contract claims to avoid ERISA preemption. 42
238. See Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392, 393 (Ct. App. 1980).
239. But see Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1994) (holding as actionable plaintiffs
claim that plastic surgeon warranted results of breast augmentation surgery).
240. 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1979).
241. Id. at 393.
242. See Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 302-03 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting futility
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For these reasons, courts do not use the denial of benefits versus quality of care
distinction or the physical versus economic loss distinction to address preemption
of claims based on breach of contract theories. Instead, courts that have addressed
breach of contract or warranty claims against HMOs operating under ERISAgoverned plans have characterized those claims as directly relating to an ERISA
plan and, thus, subject to ERISA preemption.243
For example, in Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan,'M the plaintiffs
breach of contract claim alleged that the HMO's coverage decision resulted in
delayed surgery and the subscriber's death. The Kuhl court recognized that the
HMO's decision may have constituted a breach of its contractual duty to provide
quality medical care.24 In fact, the court suggested that other HMOs which
venture into medical decision making might be held liable for breach of contract
if their decisions result in poor quality medical care.' However, in the final
analysis, the Kuhl court abandoned the quality of care categorization. The court
reasoned that resolution of the plaintiffs claim required interpreting the HMO
contract made pursuant to the employee benefit plan governed by ERISA.u 7
Thus, the plaintiffs claim directly related to the ERISA-governed plan and was
preempted.'
Likewise, in Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 9 the court abandoned the
physical versus economic loss distinction to hold that ERISA preempted a breach
of contract claim against an HMO2' In Settles, the widow of an employee sued
an insurer for breach of contract, among other claims, alleging that its action in
terminating her husband's insurance coverage caused him to have a heart attack.
The Settles court explicitly recognized that the widow's claim was not for
economic loss but rather for physical injury - in this case, death."' Nevertheless, the Settles court disregarded the categorization of physical loss claims to
hold that the plaintiffs breach of contract claim was preempted.2
As Kuhl and Settles demonstrate, courts selectively use the various tests
available to determine the scope of ERISA preemption depending on the type of
claim involved. Case law suggests that courts are likely to apply ERISA
preemption to all breach of contract claims brought against HMOs operating as
part of an employee benefit plan. 3 However, the analysis and classifications

of artful pleading by plaintiff in characterizing HMO's actions as "cancellation" and "malpractice").
243. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987) (holding as preempted a common
law breach of contract claim based on improper processing of a claim for benefits are relating to an
employee benefit plan).
244. 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993).
245. See id. at 303.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id.

249. 927 F.2d 505 (10th Cir. 1991).
250. See i.d
at 509.
251. See id.
252. See id.

253. See Kuhl v. Lincoln Natl Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding ERISA to
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employed by the courts vary significantly and are likely to confuse future
questions about preemption of contractual claims.
3. ERISA Preemption of Contract Claims Under the Intrinsic Test
Under the intrinsic claims test proposed in this comment, subscriber claims
against HMOs for breach of contract would automatically be preempted by
ERISA. Breach of contract claims depend upon an interpretation of the subscriber
contract from which HMO membership arises. The HMO subscriber contract is
an essential element of employee benefit plans that offer health insurance
coverage to members. A plan participant may only receive HMO coverage
through signing a subscriber contract provided by the plan. In other words, under
all of the aforementioned contractual theories, a plaintiff essentially alleges that
the coverage guaranteed by the HMO subscriber contract is different or greater
than the coverage that was actually provided. Because health coverage through
an IMO is the benefit provided by a plan, state law claims for breach of contract
challenge the method by which plans administer health coverage through the
HMO. As indicated in Travelers, state laws that mandate a method of plan
administration would be preempted by ERISA.'
B. Intentional Tort Claims
1. Fraudand Misrepresentation
Under facts similar to those that support breach of contract and warranty
claims, a plaintiff may bring claims of misrepresentation or fraud against an
HMO. These claims involve allegations that an HMO intentionally misrepresented
the quality of care or scope of coverage that it provides to subscribers, thereby
inducing new subscribers to join. 5 Like warranty claimants, plaintiffs alleging
misrepresentation or fraud point to language in subscriber contracts and
promotional literature to support their claims. Thus, as HMOs wage more
aggressive marketing campaigns to compete for the remainder of America's
potential subscribers, misrepresentation and fraud claims are likely to increase in
number.'
However, these claims are necessarily limited by the difficult
evidentiary burdens of proving intentional misrepresentation and justifiable

preempt contractual claim brought by subscriber as third-party beneficiary); Elsesser v. Hospital of the
Phila. College of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding as preempted a
breach of contract claim based on failure to provide quality care); Rollo v. Maxicare of La., 695 F. Supp.
245, 247 (E.D. La. 1988) (preempting quality of care physical injury contract claim, among others).
254. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115
S. Ct. 1671, 1678 (1995) ("In each of these cases, ERISA pre-empted state laws that mandated employee
benefit structures or their administration.").
255. See, e.g., Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1979); McClellan
v. Health Maintenance Org., 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), affd, 686 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996).
256. The results of Pulvers and McClellan suggest this likelihood. Whereas the Pulvers court
rejected the plaintiffs fraud claim as legally insufficient, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94, the McClellan court,
sitting twelve years after Pulvers was decided, entertained a plaintiffs allegations of fraud by an HMO,
604 A.2d at 1060.
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reliance. In addition, fraud and misrepresentations claims are limited by the
umbrella defense of ERISA preemption.
In general, plaintiffs allege fraud and misrepresentation theories on the basis
of a substandard quality of care, not on the basis of fraud in the administration
of plan benefits. Despite these bases of liability, most courts that have addressed
ERISA preemption of fraud and misrepresentation claims have rejected a quality
of care versus denial of benefits analysis. For instance, in Elsesser v. Hospitalof
the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine' the court recognized that
the plaintiffs fraud claim was "based on representations over the extent of and
nature of the care provided under the benefit plan.""5 Despite the fact that the
plaintiffs fraud claim was based on the delivery of medical care, a matter outside
the scope of ERISA, the Elsesser court held that ERISA preempted the claim. " 9
Thus, the court rejected a quality of care analysis. Ironically, the Elsesser court
relied on a quality of care classification, in the very same opinion, to hold that
ERISA does not preempt medical malpractice claims against HMOs."w The
Elsessercourt's selective reasoning was further confused by the fact that the court
interpreted the statute's preemption clause to permit both removal and dismissal2" - improperly combining the two concepts of complete and conflict
preemption.
Like the court in Elsesser, the court in Settles v. Golden Rule Insurance Co.262
concluded that ERISA preempted a plaintiffs fraud claim." However, the
Settles court reasoned that fraud claims do not deal with the quality of care
provided under a plan, but rather require findings that a defendant HMO
improperly administered the subscriber's insurance coverage.' Thus, the Settles
court classified the plaintiffs fraud claim as an alleged improper denial of benefits
that is preempted by ERISA.' The inconsistencies between Settles and Elsesser
indicate that, although courts are likely to apply ERISA preemption to fraud and
misrepresentation claims, the reasoning used may vary drastically. If fraud claims
against HMOs become more prevalent in the courts, then the varying rationales
for determining ERISA preemption may result in conflicting holdings that will
add more confusion to the issue of HMO liability.
However, the framework proposed in this comment would help clarify the
scope of ERISA preemption in the context of fraud and misrepresentation claims.

257. 802 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
258. Id. at 1292.
259. See id.

260. See id. at 1290. The Elsesser court noted that allegations of vicarious liability rely upon
principles of professional malpractice, which implicate the quality of care classification, rather than on
the HMO's contractual obligations as a employee benefit plan administrator. See id.
261. See id. at 1292. The Elsesser court only considered ERISA section 514 in determining the
motion to remand. Id. at 1289. As discussed previously, the proper determination of a covet's preemption
jurisdiction requires consideration of section 502. See text accompanying notes 123-36.
262. 927 F.2d 505 (10th Cir. 1991).
263. See id. at 509.
264. See id.
265. See id.
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Such claims do not arise from activities that are related to the inherent structure
of an HMO, nor do they depend on the existence of a subscriber contract.2 Not
all HMOs must intentionally misrepresent their claims process or the quality of
doctors with whom they contract. Fraud is not fundamental to the cost-containment structuring of an HMO.' Rather, claims of fraud and misrepresentation
relate to the particular actions of a single HMO toward its subscribers. While a
judgment that a particular HMO committed fraud against an employee benefit
plan participant might indirectly raise the costs of IMO membership for benefit
plans, the Travelers Court recognized that such indirect economic effects do not
constitute plan regulation that would trigger preemption.'
2. Breach of FiduciaryDuty
Another potential state law claim against HMOs involves an organization's
breach of its fiduciary duties to a subscriber. This state law claim must be
carefully distinguished from a fiduciary duty claim cognizable under ERISA.'
Although few states currently recognize a fiduciary relationship between an HMO
and its subscribers, the conceptual basis for such a claim under state law derives
from the special relationship between a patient and physician and, in some states,
between an insurer and insured."' The subscriber in an HIMO places her
absolute trust and confidence in the organization to provide total health services
at a high quality. In addition, because an HMO restricts a subscriber's choice of
physicians, facilities, and providers, the HMO has a heightened duty of care
a fiduciary duty.
By contrast, ERISA imposes separate statutory obligations and liabilities on
specified "fiduciaries" for the benefit of a plan.2 ' Unlike fiduciaries under state
law, ERISA fiduciaries must either be explicitly designated as such in the plan
instrument or, pursuant to a procedure specified in the plan, be identified as a
fiduciary by the employer, the employee organization, or both.2' ERISA
fiduciaries "have authority to control and manage the operation and administration

266. Although many fraud and misrepresentation claims may refer to a statement made in the
subscriber contract, the essence of the fraud claim relies on the statement and the intent behind it, not
on the existence of the contract itself.
267. Some plaintiffs might choose to base their fraud claims on the alleged intentional nondisclosure
by HMOs that they use cost-containment measures such as utilization review. Even these claims would
not be preempted because the alleged nondisclosure constitutes the underlying conduct, not the use of

cost-control mechanisms. Intentional nondisclosure does not arise from a contractual relationship or from
the cost-containment structure of HMOs, and thus would not be preempted.
268. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115
S. Ct. 1671, 1683 (1995).

269. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1109 (1994) (sections of ERISA defining plan "fiduciaries" and setting
forth obligations to the plan).
270. Oklahoma does not recognize the existence of a fiduciary relationship between insurer and
insured. See Silver v. Slusher, 770 P.2d 878, 883 (Okla. 1988). However, the dissent in Silver urged the
Court to recognize the special duties that adhere to the insurer. See id. at 886 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
271. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994).
272. See id. § 1102(a)(2).
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of the plan."2' They are required to discharge their duties "solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries[,]" using "care, skill, prudence, and
diligence."'
An ERISA plan fiduciary "who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by [ERISA] shall be
personally liable to make good to [the] plan any losses ... resulting from each
27
such breach.""
Thus, a plan participant may only sue certain individuals in
their capacity as ERISA fiduciaries on behalf of the plan itself - the statute does
not provide a private right of action for breach of fiduciary duty.
Despite the differences between an ERISA fiduciary and a fiduciary relationship under state Taw, most courts have held that ERISA preempts state law
fiduciary duty claims.7
However, case law suggests that a finding of
preemption may depend upon whether: (1) the defendant HMO is an ERISA
fiduciary and (2) the state law claim arises out of a complaint about administration of the benefit plan. For example, in Santitoro v. Evans,"n the court
held that ERISA (lid not completely preempt a plaintiffs fiduciary duty claim
against an HMO because the claim related to a duty to provide "medical care
imposed by state' tort law" rather than to a contractual duty imposed by the
employee benefit plan. 8 Similarly, in Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local
252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Securities,' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that ERISA only preempted a state law fiduciary duty
claim under section 514 if that claim related to administration of the employee
benefit plan.' In concurring, Judge Stapleton added his opinion that when a
defendant is not a designated ERISA fiduciary of a benefit plan, a state law
fiduciary duty claim does not relate to the benefit plan within the meaning of
section 514 and is not preempted."'
The reasoning of both Santitoro and Glaziers illustrates the complexity of
applying the Supreme Court's current test for ERISA preemption to suits against
HMOs. Courts that use the quality of care classification are likely to reject the
ERISA preemption defense as inapplicable to a fiduciary duty claim. By contrast,
a direct versus indirect claim categorization would lead to a finding of
preemption, becau;e an interpretation of the HMO contract would be necessary
to determine the existence of a fiduciary duty. The physical versus economic loss
distinction creates further confusion, as a fiduciary duty claim could fit into either
category, depending upon whether or not the plaintiff received care from the
HMO.

273. l § 1102(a)(1).

274. Id. § 1104(a)(1).
275. Id. § 1109(a).
276. See, e.g., Kramer v. Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080, 1084 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding state law
claims of breach of fiduiary duty completely preempted by ERISA).
277. 935 F. Supp. 733 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
278. See id. at 736.
279. 93 F.3d 1171 (3d Cir. 1996).
280. See id. at 1185.
281. See id. at 1186 (Stapleton, J., concurring).
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Thus, the traditional approaches to ERISA preemption are inadequate to
determining the proper scope of section 514. However, an intrinsic claims test
would definitively result in a finding of preemption. The reasoning is simple: The
inherent structure and purpose of HMOs is to provide health care coverage at an
affordable price through careful management of costs. It is this inherent structure
that allows HMOs to operate as alternatives to traditional health insurance and,
thus, gives rise to a fiduciary obligation under state law, if one exists at all.
Consequently, claims for breach of fiduciary duty challenge the inherent structure
of all HMOs. ERISA clearly preempts such claims under the intrinsic test.
3. Tortious Interference with Contract
A number of plaintiffs have brought claims for tortious interference with a
contract against their HMOs.' Under a tortious interference claim, a plaintiff
alleges that her HMO has intentionally and tortiously engaged in misconduct to
interfere with contractual relations between the plaintiff and her physician or
employer. More specifically, tortious interference claims typically question an
HIMO's utilization review procedures or financial risk-sharing arrangements. The
plaintiff alleges that the HMO purposefully designed its review procedures or
risk-sharing arrangements to discourage doctors from performing costly medical
services or prescribing expensive methods of treatment, which might be necessary
to properly care for the patient. Tortious interference claimants may also allege
that this interference prevents employers from providing promised benefits to their
employees.
Courts have generally been unwilling to recognize an HMO's utilization review
procedures or risk-sharing financial arrangements as intentional misconduct - a
required element of a tortious interference claim.' One court even noted that
utilization review and risk-sharing are inherent characteristics of IMOs that are
encouraged by the federal IMO Act.' In addition, courts have held, without
much analysis, that ERISA preempts tortious interference claims against HMOs
operating under employee benefit plans.
For example, in Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan,' a physician and
hospital had recommended immediate bypass surgery for the plaintiff, an HMO
subscriber. The HIMO denied their requests for precertification, and the physician
canceled the plaintiffs surgery. On review of its decision, the HMO agreed to pay
for the surgery. By that time, however, the plaintiffs heart had deteriorated
beyond repair. The plaintiff sued his HMO, claiming tortious interference with
the doctor-patient contract. The Kuhl court held that ERISA preempted the claim
because it was based on the contention that the HMO improperly processed the

282. See, e.g., Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993); Reazin v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990); Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1979).

283. See Reazin, 899 F.2d at 977 (stating that wrongful intent to interfere is required element of
tortious interference claim).
284. See Pulvers, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
285. 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993).
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plaintiff's request for benefits.' The court noted that, while the HMO's benefit
determination resulted in cancellation of the claimant's surgery and, thus, affected
the quality of care provided to the plaintiff, the decision was actually a benefit
determination that was not subject to state law claims.' Thus, the Kuhl court
followed a quality of care versus denial of benefits analysis to find that ERISA
preempted the tortious interference claim."8
The intrinsic claims test proposed in this comment would result in a finding of
nonpreemption. Like fraud and misrepresentation claims, claims for tortious
interference with a contract do not arise from the subscriber contract between the
plan members and the HMO or to the inherent structure of HMOs in general.
While HMOs have a certain degree of indirect control over their physicians, not
all HMOs use that control to intentionally interfere with the doctor-patient
relationship to such an extent that medical care is jeopardized. Therefore, a
tortious interference plaintiff is not challenging the structure of the HMO itself
or the inherent existence of an HMO-physician relationship. Instead, a tortious
interference complaint arises from the intentional misconduct of a particular HMO
toward its subscribers. Under the interpretive framework proposed, ERISA would
not preempt such a claim.
C. Negligence Claims
By far the greatest number of claims advanced against HMOs by patients
concern direct negligence liability. All negligence claims against HMOs are
premised on the four basic elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and
damages. However, they also support vastly different theories and involve varying
factual allegations. In addjtion, negligence claims have received varying analyses
in the courts with regard to both the merits of a claim and ERISA preemption.
The following section separates negligence claims into three major categories and
discusses ERISA preemption of each different category.
1. Negligent Affiliation
The most common type of negligence claim is what this comment refers to as
a "negligent affiliation" claim. Under a negligent affiliation theory, a plaintiff
may allege that her HMO breached its duty to select, credential, retain, or
supervise quality medical providers. Plaintiffs level these claims directly against
an HMO and do not rely on any theory of respondeat superior." 9
The general thrust of a negligent affiliation claim is that an HMO was negligent
in its affiliation with a member physician or other medical provider. However,
negligent affiliation claims spring from two different theoretical bases. The

286. See id. at 302-03.
287. See iU at 303.
288. See id.
289. Respondeat sulerior is the legal term meaning, literally, "let the master answer." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1311-12 (6th ed. 1990). The doctrine as applied means that in some cases, the master will
be liable for the tortious acts of his servant.
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difference between these two underlying theories have significantly affected
courts' preemption analyses and led to confusion over the scope of ERISA
preemption with respect to negligent affiliation claims.
The first basic theory underlying the negligent affiliation claim is that an
HMO's duty to use reasonable care in affiliating with medical providers depends
Under this view, the HMO's duty is
on the underlying duty of its providers.'
However, the HMO's liability
to
its
subscribers.
separate
and
runs
directly
still
that
the member physician or
for negligent affiliation relies upon a finding
in performance of
incompetent
it
affiliated
was
knowingly
provider with whom
its duty. 9 The second conceptual basis for the negligent affiliation claim is that
an IMO's duty to reasonably select, credential, retain, and supervise quality
medical providers stems directly from its independent relationship with its
subscribers, not from the underlying duties of its providers."g This underlying
theory also supports the theory of corporate negligence293 and forms the basis
for section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2'
Both rationales support the same legal conclusion - that an HMO may be
liable to a subscriber for negligent affiliation with incompetent providers.
However, the distinction between the reasoning of the two courts is crucial under
the current analytical approaches to determining ERISA preemption. If a court
determines that the IMO's duty of reasonable affiliation with member physicians
depends on its physicians' underlying duties to their patients, then an HMO's
breach of reasonable affiliation gives rise to a negligence claim involving the
quality of care provided to patients. Courts applying a quality of care versus
denial of benefits classification are unlikely to find that ERISA preempts such
claims. On the other hand, if a court determines that the IMO has a separate and
independent duty to use reasonable care in affiliating with its physicians, then
liability for breach of that duty arises out of the IMO's responsibilities under the
ERISA-governed plan. Courts using this rationale are likely to find such claims
preempted by ERISA.
A review of recent case law involving negligent affiliation claims against
ERISA-governed HMOs reveals the confusion surrounding these two, different
rationales and their effect on ERISA preemption. In Corcoran v. United

290. See Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58, 60-61 (Mo. 1989) (en banc).
291. See id.at 60.
292. See, e.g., McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org., 604 A.2d 1053, 1059 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
293. See id.
at 1058-59; see, e.g., Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703,706 (Pa. 1991) ("Mhe
corporate hospital of today has assumed the role of a comprehensive health center, with responsibility
for arranging and coordinating the total health care of its patients.").
294. Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is
subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increased the risk of harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
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Healthcare, Inc., 5 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because the
plaintiffs negligent affiliation claim related to supervision of benefits administrators, it implicated the plaintiffs relationship with the HMO and was
preempted by ERISA.2' The Sixth Circuit followed suit in Tolton v. American
Biodyne,2 ' holding that a claim for negligent retention of a utilization review
administrator was preempted because it arose out of an alleged improper denial
of benefits.298
Although the courts in Corcoranand Tolton both held the negligent affiliation
claims to be preempted without much analysis of their conceptual bases, the
holdings of both courts suggest a belief that HIMOs' duties of reasonable
affiliation derive from the duties of those with whom they affiliate. In other
words, the benefits administrators in both cases had a duty to administer benefits
competently, and the HMOs' duties to retain and supervise their administrators
arose from the same responsibilities. Thus, the duties breached by the HMOs
related to a denial of benefits and were subject to ERISA preemption.
In this respect, the courts were simply applying the familiar quality of care
versus denial of benefits classification to determine the scope of ERISA
preemption. For instance, the Tolton court stressed that the basis of the plaintiffs
claim was for an alleged improper denial of benefits.' Similarly, the court in
Corcoranstated that the plaintiffs "attempt to distinguish United's role in paying
claims from its role as a source of professional medical advice was unconvincing.""sw Ultimately, the Corcorancourt concluded that "United makes medical
decisions - indeed, United gives medical advice - but it does so in the context
of making a deternination about the availability of benefits under the plan." ''
Following in the footsteps of Corcoranand Tolton, the Third Circuit in Dukes
v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc." also applied the quality of care versus denial of
benefits classification to a negligent affiliation claim. But unlike the two previous
courts, the Dukes court held that the plaintiffs negligent affiliation claim was not
preempted by ERISA 3" The essential difference between the three cases is that,
in Dukes, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant HMO failed to use reasonable
care in selecting, screening, monitoring, and evaluating medical providers rather
than claims administrators.3" Because the HMO's duty arose from its providers'
duties to their patients, breach of that duty constituted negligence involving the
quality of care rather than the administration of benefits. 5 Under the quality

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
.300.
301.
302.
303.

965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 1332.
48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 942.
See id.
Concoran, 965 F.2d at 1325.
Id. at 1331.
57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
See id. at 361.

304. See id. at 360.
305. See it at 361 ("The plaintiffs here are attempting to hold the HMO's liable for their role as
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of care distinction applied by Dukes, ERISA did not preempt the plaintiffs
negligent affiliation claim.3"
The reasoning in Dukes stands in contrast to the analysis in Pomeroy v. Johns
Hopkins Medical Services, 7 in which a plaintiff alleged that his HMO was
negligent in selecting, employing, contracting, and retaining unqualified medical
providers. Whereas the Dukes court found that ERISA does not reach such
claims, the Pomeroy court held that the plaintiffs claim was predicated on a duty
"created and defined by the relationship between [the HMO] and the Plaintiffs
through the Plan."3 " Reasoning that the HMO's duty existed independently of
its physicians' responsibilities to provide quality care, the Pomeroy court applied
a direct liability classification to the plaintiffs negligent affiliation claim and held
it to be preempted by ERISA.07
Pomeroy, Dukes, Tolton, and Corcoranreveal the morass of confusion over the
issue of ERISA preemption. All four courts addressed negligent affiliation claims
against IMOs. However, the reasoning and results of the four courts differed
significantly. Dukes only addressed the issue of whether ERISA completely
preempted the plaintiffs claim."' The other courts incorrectly combined the
concepts of complete and conflict preemption.3" Corcoran, Tolton, and Dukes
placed significance on the underlying duty of the allegedly incompetent actor." 2
If the claim was for an I-IMO's negligent affiliation with an unqualified benefits
administrator, the claim related to a denial of benefits and was preempted by
ERISA." 3 On the other hand, if the plaintiff alleged an HMO's negligent
affiliation with an unsatisfactory medical provider, then the claim dealt with the
unreasonable quality of care and was not preempted. 14 By contrast, Pomeroy
relied upon the reasoning that the plaintiffs claim directly related to the HMO's
independent duties under the employee benefit plan."' Application of this
reasoning would undoubtedly result in the preemption of all negligent affiliation
claims, regardless of whether they involved medical providers or benefits
administrators." 6 Clearly, the different reasoning and outcomes of the four cases

the arrangers of the decedent's medical treatment."); Santitoro v. Evans, 935 F. Supp. 733, 737 (E.D.N.C.
1996) (remanding negligent affiliation claim and other claims after finding complete preemption under

ERISA does not apply to claims involving quality of care).
306. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 361; see also Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269,272-73 (2d Cir.

1994).
307. 868 F. Supp. 110 (D. Md. 1994).

308. Id. at 113 n.4.
309. See id. at 113.
310. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 361.
311. See Tolton v. American Biodrune, 48 F.2d 937, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1995); Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1328-29 (5th Cir. 1992); Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc.,
868 F. Supp. 110, 111-16 (D. Md. 1994).
312. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 360-61; Tolton, 48 F.3d at 942; Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1331.
313. See Tolton, 48 F.3d at 942; Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1332.

314. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 361.
315. See Pomeroy, 868 F. Supp. at 113.
316. An HMO's duties to a plan subscriber arise from the plan. Thus, the HMO's activities,
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illustrate that the traditional analyses for determining the scope of ERISA

preemption are inadequate.
Applying the intrinsic test to negligent affiliation claims would definitively
result in a finding of nonpreemption. As indicated earlier in this section, negligent
affiliation claims are based either on the underlying duty of the provider with
whom an HMO affiliates or on the HMO's independent relationship with its
subscribers." 7 Neither theory relies on the terms of the HMO subscriber
contract. Nor does either theory implicate the inherent structure of HMOs in
providing health coverage and containing costs.
While it is true that the HMO-physician relationship is defined by the costcontainment mechanisms inherent in HMOs, a negligent affiliation claim does not
challenge the existence of this relationship. 18 Rather, the duty of reasonable
affiliation arises for an HMO when it decides to selectively choose its physicians.
If the HMO allowed its subscribers to visit any medical provider willing to accept
capitated payments and submit to utilization review, then no duty of reasonable
affiliation would arise. 19 Thus, a negligent affiliation claim results from an
HMO's voluntary d.ecision to screen and select only certain medical providers.
Under the proposed framework, which separates claims that challenge the inherent
structure of.HlMOs generally from those based on the singular actions of a
particular HMO, negligent affiliation claims would fit into the latter category and
would not be preempted by ERISA.
2. Negligent Design or Implementation of Utilization Review Procedures

Another claim against HMOs that reveals the limitations of the current
interpretive approaches and the benefits of the proposed framework for determining ERISA preemption is a claim for negligence in the design or implementation of utilization review procedures. Utilization review is one of the most
essential cost-containment mechanisms employed by an HMO.32' Organizations
generally implement utilization review in one of three ways: prospectively,
concurrently, or retrospectively.' The utilization review method employed by
the IMO also affects the classification of the plaintiffs claim for purposes of
determining ERISA preemption. Thus, negligent utilization review claims provide

regardless of whether such activities are benefit determinations or medical treatment decisions, are
directly related to the plan. A direct classification theory, therefore, would result in preemption of all

negligent affiliation clainis.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 290-94.
318. A challenge to the inherent existence of the HMO-physician relationship is one which questions
the amount of control an HMO exercises over its physician's practice of medicine. By contrast, the
negligent affiliation claim challenges the apparent lack of control an HMO has over the quality of its
physicians.
319. This is true beiause the provider would not be restricted to a specified list of physicians
approved by the HMO. It is this restriction on consumer choice that results in a duty of reasonable
affiliation.
320. See Kilcullen, supra note 10, at 23.
321. See Randall et ,d., supra note 83, at 1130.
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an interesting look at the difficulties in determining the scope of ERISA's
preemption clause.
Under a negligent utilization review theory, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant HMO or its agent followed improper review procedures, resulting in a
denial of benefits and injury to the plaintiff.3" The plaintiffs injury might be
physical, economic, or both, depending upon the utilization review method
employed by the HMO. If the IMO utilized the traditional retrospective system,
then the patient might have a claim for recovery of the coverage owed to him
under the plan. Under a prospective or concurrent utilization review scheme, in
which the IMO requires precertification or concurrent certification for all
procedures, treatments, and referrals, the plaintiff might very well have a state
cause of action for both physical and economic damages resulting from an
improper decision.
Negligent utilization review claims are controversial for several reasons. First,
they reach to the heart of the managed care system. If an HMO can be held liable
for improperly administering one of its key components, or if the mere existence
of that component might be deemed negligent, then the basic existence of iHMOs
is essentially called into question. Second, utilization review claims vary widely
in both factual allegations and analysis. Many HMOs have contracted with
outside companies to provide utilization review for its subscribers, so a number
of utilization review cases also address questions of vicarious liability and
corporate negligence."
By far the most controversial aspect of negligent utilization review claims is
the question of ERISA preemption. As discussed above, courts may fit negligent
utilization review claims into every analytical approach used to determine the
reach of ERISA's preemption clause. In addition to the physical versus economic
loss classifications, courts may choose to categorize all negligent utilization
review claims as direct claims requiring interpretation of the ERISA-governed
plan. Prospective and concurrent utilization review claims might also be classified
as either quality of care claims or benefit determinations, while retrospective
review claims would fall solely into the category of a benefit administration
decision. Thus, courts may select whatever classification they wish to determine
whether ERISA preempts negligent utilization review claims. Most often,
utilization review decisions, even concurrent and prospective review determinations, have been cast as benefit determinations preempted by ERISA. 37

322. See, e.g., Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 670 (Ct. App. 1986) (noting in dicta that third
party payors such as HMOs might be held liable for patient harm if plaintiff proves causation), appeal
dismissed, 741 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987); Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 883 (Ct. App. 1990)
(denying summary judgment motion on grounds that HMO could be held liable for patient harm).
323. See, e.g. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1323-24 (5th Cir. 1992)
(concurrent review of hospitalization of expecting mother).
324. See Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1993) (concurrent review of cancer
treatment); Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298,302 (8th Cir. 1993) (prospective review
of heart surgery); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992) (concurrent
review of hospitalization of expecting mother).
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This has resulted in very few utilization review claims being decided on their
merits.
Under the propo:3ed framework, claims for negligent utilization review would
clearly qualify as intrinsic claims because they challenge the utilization review
process inherent in all HMOs. Utilization review is an essential element of cost
containment. It is required by the federal HMO Act,3" and every HIMO employs
some form of utilization review. Unlike the duty of reasonable affiliation, the
duty of reasonableness in utilization review arises from the inherent structure and
purpose of all HMOs - not from the voluntary decisions of a single HMO. Thus,
claims for negligent utilization review directly implicate the employee benefit
structure referred to in Travelers and would be preempted by ERISA section
514.
3. Negligent Formulationof Risk-Sharing FinancialIncentives
Under a theory of negligent risk-sharing, a plaintiff may allege that her HMO
breached its duty of reasonable care by providing financial incentives that
encourage its physicians to refrain from utilizing costly medical services such as
referrals, medical tests, or inpatient hospital stays."z While all HMOs utilize
some form of risk-sharing, the forms vary according to the IMO-physician
contract. In general, an HMO's financial arrangements shift some or all of the
insurer's risk to the physician, encouraging the physician to utilize fewer services
and maximize his profit. The incentives range from a simple capitation system,
in which a physician is paid a flat-rate per subscriber, to bonus and penalty
arrangements. Under these latter arrangements, a physician either receives a
percentage of the HMO's profits from his client base or he must contribute to any
deficit the HMO suffers from his client base."
As a result of the difference in risk-sharing plans, plaintiffs face varying
degrees of evidentiary burdens in proving breach of duty and causation. Many
courts may be unwilling to hold that simple capitation arrangements, the staple
of HMOs, constitute a breach of duty and legal cause of injury.3" However,

325. See 42 U.S.C .! 300e(c)(6) (1994).
326. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115
S. Ct. 1671, 1678 (1995).
327. See, e.g., Bush v. Dake, No. 86-25767 NM-2, slip. op. at 3 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Saginaw County
1989), reprinted in BARRY R. FURROW Er AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 719
(2d ed. 1991). In Bush, the plaintiff claimed that his HMO was negligent in formulating risk-sharing
arrangements and financial incentives that subsequently affected a member physician's medical

determination. The HMO argued on summary judgment that it could not be liable for its risk-sharing
financial arrangements because those arrangements were encouraged by state and federal law such as the
federal HMO Act. The Buish court agreed that the HMO's cost-containment mechanisms were supported
by public policy. However, the court also held that ajury should determine whether the HMO's financial
arrangements proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries and imposed negligence liability.

328. See Johnsson, mupra note 106, at I (discussing bonus arrangements).
329. This is especially true when one considers that capitation arrangements apply generally to all
patients and are not patient-specific, thus making the element of causation particularly difficult to prove.
See Chittenden, supra note 84, at 483.
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courts may be more inclined to believe that bonus arrangements specifically
designed to limit utilization of services might unreasonably create an unhealthy
medical atmosphere for HMO subscribers.
The problems of applying ERISA's preemption clause are no less tedious when
it comes to negligent risk-sharing claims. Under a quality of care versus denial
of benefits classification, a court may determine that the existence of financial
incentives and risk-sharing arrangements have no relation to determination of
coverage under an ERISA-governed plan. This reasoning would result in the
conclusion that negligent risk-sharing claims relate to the quality of care provided
by an HMO and, therefore, would not be preempted by ERISA.
For example, in Ouellette v. Christ Hospital,3 a plaintiff sued her HMO for
"limiting the hospital stays of its subscribers and enforcing those limitations by
an unreasonable system of financial incentives to hospitals."33 ' The Ouellette
court held that ERISA did not completely preempt the plaintiffs claim because
it focused on the relationship between the HMO and its physicians instead of on
the relationship between the HMO and the plaintiff.332 The court reasoned that
the claim related to the quality of care received333 and, thus, was "separate and
distinct from a claim for benefits under a plan.
However, a direct versus indirect classification analysis is likely to lead courts
to the opposite conclusion. Under this analysis, a court is likely to find that the
HMO's risk-sharing arrangements directly involve a subscriber's contract with his
employee benefit plan. Thus, any claim arising from these financial arrangements
would relate to the plan and be preempted by ERISA. The difficulty for a court,
therefore, is determining which classification to use.
However, the intrinsic claims analysis encompasses the traditional approaches
to determining ERISA preemption and would eliminate unnecessary confusion for
future courts. Under the intrinsic claims test, claims for negligent risk-sharing
would be preempted just like claims for negligent utilization review. Risk-sharing
is a fundamental aspect of all HMOs. It arises from the inherent need to contain
costs by shifting financial risk to medical providers. While no HMO is forced to
engage in the most precarious forms of risk-sharing, such forms are basic
elements in the structural composition of HMOs. Claims that challenge the
existence of these structural elements would be preempted by ERISA under the
intrinsic claims test.
D. Vicarious Liability Claims
1. Basis of Vicarious Liability
In addition to direct negligence claims, plaintiffs have also alleged that HMOs
are vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their agents.3" The principle for

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

942 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
Id. at 1163-64.
See id. at 1165.
Id.
See Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Sloan v.
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bringing a vicarious liability claim against an HMO derives from a recent trend
in the law that holds hospitals liable for the acts of physicians and other providers
within the hospital's authority?3 Under vicarious liability claims, plaintiffs must
prove the underlying action against the medical provider or benefits administrator
as well as the existence of an agency, apparent agency, or agency by estoppel
relationship between the provider and the HMO. Thus, an HMO must have
authorized or apparently authorized its medical providers to act as its agents in
providing medical care to subscribers.
Like other type; of claims against HMOs, vicarious liability claims have many
different facets and factual bases. For instance, plaintiffs can generally establish
the existence of an agency relationship in a staff model HMO because a direct
employment relat.onship exists between the HMO and its physicians."6 In the
case of IPA and group model IMOs, in which physicians and physician groups
independently contract with the HMO, the existence of an agency relationship is
more difficult for the trier of fact to determine.337
However, an lIMO may still be held vicariously liable under the doctrines of
"apparent agency" and "agency by estoppel. '33 To prove the existence of an
apparent agency relationship, a plaintiff must prove: (1)that the HMO held out
certain physicians as its agents and (2) that the plaintiff looked to the HMO to
provide medical care, not to the providers alone.339 To prove agency by
estoppel, a plaintiff must establish the two elements of apparent agency as well
as a third element - that the plaintiff reasonably and justifiably relied on the
HMO's representations to her detrimentf'
The elements of both types of ostensible agency relationships seem fairly easy
for a plaintiff to prove given the current status of HMOs in the nation's health
care system. To establish the elements of either, HMO subscribers may point to
the fact that the HMO provides a limited list of available physicians from which
to choose and generally forces subscribers to see a primary care physician before

Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Williams v. Good Health
Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. App. 1987, no writ).
335. See Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1231-32 (discussing nature of vicarious liability theory applied to
HMOs).
336. See Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)
(reversing summary judgment to staff model HMO because reasonable jury could find existence of
agency relationship).
337. See Chase v. Independent Practice Ass'n, 583 N.E.2d 251, 253 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (finding
no agency relationship between IPA model HMO and contracted physicians); Williams v. Good Health
Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App. 1987, no writ) (holding that agency relationship did not exist
between HMO and its independently contracted physicians).
338. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 267 (1958); Chittenden, supra note 84, at 458-59; see also Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547
A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (reversing summary judgment to IPA model HMO on apparent
agency theory of vicarious liability claim).
339. See Chittendcn, supranote 84, at 458; see also Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376,1380 (Alaska
1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 429 (1965).
340. See REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958); Chittenden, supra note 84, at 458-59.
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seeing any specialist. By placing limitations on patient freedom, patients
reasonably believe that an HMO acts as a provider of health care services. In
addition, HMOs regularly hold themselves out to be health care providers in their
-advertisements, leading the general public to see them as such. Thus, plaintiffs
argue, HMOs should be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts of their
providers.
2. TraditionalApproaches to ERISA Preemption of Vicarious Liability
Claims
The more difficult question is whether ERISA preempts vicarious liability
claims against HMOs operating as elements of employee benefit plans. Because
vicarious liability claims are based on the theory of respondeatsuperior,plaintiffs
have argued that these claims relate solely to the quality of care provided and the
physician-HMO relationship, not to the administration of benefits under the plan.
Under this argument, vicarious liability claims do not implicate ERISA and are
not preempted. On the other hand, HMOs have argued that the medical care
provided is the benefit under the plan. Therefore, ERISA would preempt all
claims relating to the quality of care provided under the plan, including vicarious
liability claims for medical malpractice. Not surprisingly, courts have disagreed
over the issue of ERISA preemption of vicarious liability claims. A series of
cases decided between February 1995 and July 1996 reveals the extent of this
disagreement.
In Jackson v. Roseman,"' a plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim
against his HMO, alleging that the organization was vicariously liable for the
negligence of one of its contracted physicians. The Jackson court analyzed both
conflict preemption under ERISA section 514 and complete preemption under
section 502.2 In its analysis of the plaintiffs claim, the Jackson court recognized two opposing views as to whether ERISA preempts vicarious liability
claims. According to one view, a vicarious liability theory requires the plaintiff
to show that "the HMO held out a supposedly negligent doctor or facility as its
employee, thereby necessitating an examination of the benefits plan, and
consequently, triggering ERISA preemption." 3 Under the other view, a law
only relates to an ERISA plan, and thus is subject to ERISA preemption, if it is
designed to affect such plans, singles them out, predicates rights or obligations
on their existence, impairs their operation in multiple states, or restricts their
effectiveness with regard to structure or administration.' The Jackson court
adopted the latter view, holding that a medical malpractice claim founded on the
theory of vicarious liability is an inappropriate target for ERISA's preemption

341. 878 F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995).
at 823. Complete and conflict preemption involve two separate concepts and are often
342. See id.
confused by courts. See discussion supranotes 123-40 and accompanying text.
343. Jackson, 878 F. Supp. at 825 (quoting Pomeroyh v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc. 868 F.
Supp. 110, 113 (D. Md. 1994)).
344. See iL
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clause.l 5 Furthermore, the plaintiffs vicarious liability claim did not directly
relate to section 502, ERISA's civil enforcement provision, and thus was not
subject to complete preemption.' Therefore, in its analysis of both conflict and
complete preemption, the Jackson court used an indirect liability classification to
find that the claim was beyond ERISA's scope and not preempted.
The court in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. 7 reached the same conclusion
as the Jackson court with regard to complete preemption of a plaintiffs vicarious
liability claim.' However, the reasoning of the Dukes court differed from that
of Jackson in several important ways. First, the Dukes court distinguished
between complete preemption and conflict preemption, holding that it could not
address the latter unless it first found that removal to federal court was proper
through the doctrine of complete preemption. 9 Second, the Dukes court noted
that a claim of medical malpractice really involves the quality of medical care
provided under the plan."s Therefore, a vicarious liability claim for medical
malpractice falls outside of ERISA's scope. 51 Thus, where Jackson applied a
direct versus indir-.ect liability classification to find that the plaintiffs claim was
subject to neither complete nor conflict preemption,352 the Dukes court used a
quality of care analysis to hold only that complete preemption under section 502
did not apply? 3 Third, the Dukes court specifically left open the possibility that
conflict preemption might apply to vicarious liability claims?'
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that possibility less than one
month later in Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage 55 The court held that
the plaintiffs vicarious liability claim against the defendant HMO for medical
malpractice did not "relate to" the employee benefit plan and, thus, was not
subject to ERISA's preemption clause." The Pacificare court applied two
different classifications to the plaintiffs vicarious liability claim before subjecting
it to ERISA's preemption clause. First, the court applied a direct versus indirect
liability classiflcaon, stating that "the effect of the malpractice action on the plan
is too tenuous, remote or peripheral ... to warrant a finding that the law 'relates
to' the plan.""s Second, the Pacificarecourt noted that a malpractice claim does
not involve the benefits under a plan.35 Instead, a vicarious liability claim for
medical malpractice only alleges "negligent care by the doctor and an agency

345. See id. at 326.
346. See id.
347. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).

348.
349.
350.
351.

See
See
See
See

id. at 356.
id. at 355.
id. at 356.
id.

352. See Jackson, :378 F. Supp. at 824-26.
353. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356.
354. See id. at 361.
355. 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).

356. See id. at 155.
357. Id. at 154 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air lines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
358. See id. at 155.
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relationship between the doctor and the HMO.""3 Thus, the Pacificare court
also reasoned that ERISA's preemption clause did not apply under a quality of
care versus denial of benefits distinction.
Only two months later, the court in Rice v. Pancha36 addressed a similar
claim of vicarious liability for medical malpractice. The Rice court noted that
"[t]he Supreme Court has not yet had an opportunity to... distinguish carefully
'
Attempting to fill
between ordinary preemption and complete preemption."361
that void, the Rice court explained that where the application of a state law
creates a qualitative standard by which the performance of an ERISA-governed
HMO is evaluated, then that law is completely preempted.3" The court further
explained that determining whether an agency or apparent agency relationship
exists does not involve interpretation of the benefit plan or establish a qualitative
standard by which to evaluate such a plan." Thus, vicarious liability claims are
not subject to complete preemption under ERISA."
The Rice court's holding is important for several reasons. First, the court expressly accepted the argument offered by IMOs that the "benefit" of an employee
benefit plan involves the medical care provided.' HMOs argue that because
medical care is a benefit of the plan, ERISA preempts all claims relating to the
provision or quality of that care. Acceptance of this definition by the Rice court
stands in contrast to the court in Dukes, which declined to decide the issue.'
Second, the Rice court appeared to find the quality of care classification irrelevant
to determining whether ERISA completely preempts vicarious liability claims.
Complete preemption would apply to any claim falling under a quality of care
classification, so long as the plaintiff leveled the claim directly at the HMO.' In
fact, the court specifically mentioned the probability that ERISA would completely
preempt negligent selection of provider claims.' Third, language in the Rice
court's decision suggests that the court would apply conflict preemption under
ERISA to vicarious liability claims because such claims affect the structure of the
HMO through their inquiry into the existence or nonexistence of an agency
relationship between the HMO and its physicians.'

359. Il
360. 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995).
361. Id. at 643.
362. See id. at 644.
363. See id. at 645.
364. See i&
365. See id. at 644. The court stated that case law indicates that where state law has the effect of
creating a qualitative standard by which performance of a Plan contract is evaluated, then that state law

is completely preempted. See id.
366. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 1995).
367. See Rice, 65 F.3d at 643.
368. See id.

369. See id. at 645.
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Similar to Rice, the court in Prihoda v. Shprit.. also held that complete
preemption did not apply to a vicarious liability claim against an HMO. 7
However, the Prihodacourt cited reasoning virtually opposite to that used in Rice.
Whereas the Rice court disregarded the quality of care classification as grounds
for not applying complete preemption, the Prihodacourt expressly relied on the
quality of care approach. In concluding that the claim was not completely
preempted and that removal was improper, the Prihoda court stated:
The distinction between the quantity of benefits due under a welfare
plan and the quality of those benefits will not always be clear. In this
case, however, the distinction is clear. The plaintiff is challenging
only the quzlity of the treatment ... received. Thus,
the case is not
3
removable and must be remanded to state court. 7
Thus, Prihoda and Rice applied contrasting reasoning to reach the same
conclusion. In fact, although Jackson, Dukes, Rice, and Prihoda all concluded
that ERISA does not completely preempt vicarious liability claims for provider
malpractice, all four courts applied different reasoning to reach that conclusion.
In addition, none of the four courts agreed on the issue of whether vicarious
liability claims are subject to conflict preemption under ERISA section 514.
Prihoda does no' address the issue. Jackson and Pacificare stand for the
proposition that vicarious liability claims do not fall within the scope of ERISA's
preemption clause. Dukes recognizes the possibility that vicarious liability claims
may be preempted; Rice suggests that such a holding is probable.
The obvious disparities between the various analyses and conclusions become
even more apparent in Jass v. PrudentialHealth Care Plan, Inc.," which was
decided by the same court that decided Rice. In contrast to its previous analysis
in Rice, however, the Jass court applied a quality of care versus denial of benefits
classification to the plaintiffs two vicarious liability claims. The Jass court held
that ERISA completely preempted the plaintiff's first claim, which asserted that
the defendant HMO was vicariously liable for the improper actions of a benefits
administrator employed directly by the HMO. 74 However, the court held that
the plaintiffs second claim of vicarious liability for the malpractice of a
contracted physician was not subject to complete preemption."' The same
plaintiff had brought the claims against the same HMO for the same injury. The
only difference between the two vicarious liability claims involved the underlying
negligence - one involved an alleged improper denial of benefits, the other
involved failure to provide quality care. Thus, the Jass court abandoned the
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reasoning of Rice and applied a quality of care analysis to distinguish between the
two claims.
In addition, the Jass court held that, although ERISA did not completely
preempt the plaintiffs vicarious liability claim against the HMO for medical
malpractice, the claim was subject to conflict preemption under ERISA section
514.16 The court applied ERISA's preemption clause to the plaintiffs claim for
two reasons. First, the Jass court reasoned that the question of whether an agency
or apparent agency relationship exists directly relates to the structure of an HMO
under an ERISA-governed plan.3" Second, the court reasoned that the underlying claim against the physician was not for "negligent treatment," but rather for
"negligent failure to treat.""37 To the Jass court, this meant that the claim did
not relate to the quality of care provided under the plan, but instead related to the
provision of that care."' Thus, the claim actually related to an alleged improper
denial of benefits rather than failure to provide quality care.
This last reason is most interesting for its hypocrisy. The Jass court had
rejected complete preemption of the plaintiffs vicarious liability claim for medical
malpractice on grounds that the claim involved delivery of poor quality of care
rather than any benefits owed under the plan."s Then, later in the same opinion,
the court rejected that quality of care analysis and found that the very same claim
related to a denial of benefits and was preempted under section 514.81 Clearly,
Jass demonstrates the striking disparities of applying ERISA preemption under
the current interpretive approaches.
3. The Proposed Framework: Preemption of Vicarious Liability Claims
Perhaps the most surprising implication of the intrinsic claims framework is the
definitive preemption of vicarious liability claims against IMOs operating as part
of employee benefit plans. As indicated, vicarious liability claims are based on
the law of agency.3" Each claim, whether it is against a staff, IPA, or group
model HMO, is based on the HMO-physician relationship and the degree of
control the iMO has over that relationship. Even under apparent agency and
agency by estoppel theories, a plaintiff challenges the HMO based on her
reasonable belief that the physician was the actual agent of the HMO. 3" Thus,
every vicarious liability claim against an I4O implicates the existence of an
agency relationship between the HMO and its physicians.
The agency relationship between an HMO and its physicians, or the appearance
of such a relationship, is created by the control that the HMO retains over the
provision of medical care to its subscribers. In this respect, it is important to
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remember that all HMOs maintain some degree of control over the provision of
care so as to achieve effective cost containment. It is this control - an inherent
aspect of HMOs - that lies at the heart of a vicarious liability claim. Such a
claim directly relates to the inherent structure and purpose of HMOs as unique
providers of affordable health care coverage. Thus, vicarious liability claims are
essentially attempting to mandate the structure of HMOs and would be preempted
by ERISA under the proposed framework.
V1. Conclusion
In 1974, Congress passed ERISA to provide a comprehensive federal solution
to a major nationad problem with the law of employee benefits. Now, in 1997,
ERISA has become entangled by the relatively new and turbulent controversy
over the potential liability of HMOs. The current analytical methods for
determining whether ERISA preempts a state law claim against an HMO are
inadequate and confusing. Moreover, these analytical methods have led to a
seemingly arbitrary application of ERISA that is damaging the public trust of our
health care and legal systems.
In an effort to hadt the madness that has inflicted the law of ERISA preemption,
courts should step back from the confusing array of legal interpretations for the
phrase "relates to" in ERISA's preemption clause and refocus on the limitations
of the term "benefit." This approach closely follows the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co.,3 in which the Court indicated that ERISA preempts
state laws that force plans to adopt certain employee benefit structures or change
their administration, or which provide alternative enforcement mechanisms to
recover plan benefits.38
A proper understanding of the term "benefit" with respect to subscriber claims
against HMOs leads to the conclusion that ERISA only preempts those state law
claims that challenge the inherent nature and structure of HMOs, for it is that
inherent structure that guarantees the benefit of employee health care coverage
through HMO membership. This new approach would bind the twin concepts of
complete and conflict preemption and eliminate the artificial and deceptive tests
that have confused courts in the past. Most importantly, the new approach
outlined in this comment would serve to protect the wall of ERISA preemption
from further decay while helping to define the appropriate role of HMOs in our
nation's health care system.
Brooks Richardson
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